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Apparently fraud is a growth industry. The monetary losses from Internet fraud have 
increased every year since first officially reported by the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (IC3) in 2000. Prior research studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates 
substantially higher than eBay’s reported negative feedback rate of less than 1%. The 
conclusion is most buyers are withholding reports of negative feedback. 
 
Researchers Nikitov and Stone in a forensic case study of a single opportunistic eBay 
seller found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in positive feedback as a 
means of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their reputation. This category 
of positive feedback was described as “negative-positive” feedback. An example of 
negative-positive type feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping.”   
 
This research study investigated the concept of using negative-positive type feedback as a 
signature to identify potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population. 
 
As experienced by prior researchers using data extracted from the eBay web site, the 
magnitude of data to be analyzed in the proposed study was massive. The nature of the 
analysis required - judgment of seller behavior and contextual analysis of buyer feedback 
comments – could not be automated. The traditional method of using multiple dedicated 
human raters would have taken months of labor with a correspondingly high labor cost. 
Instead, crowdsourcing in the form of Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to reduce the 
analysis time to a few days and at a fraction of the traditional labor cost.  
 
The research’s results found that the presence of subtle buyer behavior in the form of 
negative-positive type feedback comments are an inter-buyer signal indicating that a 
seller was behaving fraudulently. Sellers with negative-positive type feedback were 1.82 
times more likely to be fraudulent. A correlation exists between an increasing number of 
negative-positive type feedback comments and an increasing probability that a seller was 
acting fraudulently. For every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive type 
feedback comments a seller was 4% more likely to be fraudulent. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Problem Statement and Goal 
     Willie Sutton the bank robber was asked why he robbed banks, his reported reply was 
"Because that's where the money is" (Sutton & Linn, 1976).  In a similar case of 
criminals following the money, the 2009 IC3 Internet Crime Report found a 22% percent 
increase in Internet fraud complaints compared to 2008 (2009 Internet crime report, 
2010). IC3 reported that monetary losses from Internet fraud increased over 210% rising 
from $264,600,000 in 2008 to $559,700,000 in 2009.  The IC3 report found incidents of 
online auction fraud dropped to fourth place in the rankings for 2009, but still composed 
a significant 10.3% of the total monetary complaints.  EBay – the largest online auction 
service – does not publicly release the total number of items listed for auction.  A third-
party vendor Medved that monitors eBay shows over 4,000,000 new listings per day are 
added to the over 106,000,000 active lists on eBay website (Medved, 2010). Even with 
thousands of eBay staff members monitoring the website around the clock; it is not 
possible to find all the potentially fraudulent auctions and immediately shut them down 
("Consumer reports survey of eBay users," 2007).  
     An opportunistic seller is someone who attempts to negate online auction safeguards 
and exploit buyers for monetary gain. The exploitation is commonly manifested as 
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criminal activity in the online auction environment. Specifically it is exhibited in the 
forms of fraud, theft, and identity stealing (impersonating another user to shield criminal 
activity).  Of these, fraud is the most prevalent (2009 Internet crime report, 2010).    
     Online auctions differ from traditional brick-and-mortar auctions.  At a traditional 
auction, the bidder has a chance to examine the items up for auction.  The auctioneer is a 
live person who controls the bidding.  Identity of the bidders, buyers, and sellers is easy 
to ascertain. Online auctions are vulnerable to fraud more than are brick-and-mortar 
transactions due to increased information asymmetry between sellers and buyers 
(Kauffman & Wood, 2000).  Online transactions rarely involve face-to-face contact; 
payment is made before goods can be inspected; repeat transactions between seller and 
buyer are unusual (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002); and no word-of-mouth reputation for 
the seller is available. Word-of-mouth is the most credible, objective, and influential 
means for exchanging feedback information and building trust since this type of 
communication among impartial buyers is unlikely to be biased or profit-driven (Kamins, 
Folkes, & Perner, 1977).  
     In order to compensate for these uncertainties, online auctions like eBay have 
instituted feedback systems that facilitate the collection and dissemination of information 
about seller past transaction behavior (Dellarocas, 2003a). By making publically 
available information about sellers’ past transactions, an institutional feedback 
mechanism facilitates buyers’ trust and reduce the risk from the community of sellers 
which enables buyer-seller transactions (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004).  It is the culmination of 
feedback from buyers in prior transactions that builds the seller’s reputation in an online 
auction. 
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   A differentiator between online and traditional auctions is the type of reciprocity used. 
A traditional auction relies on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were 
trustworthy with me before.” An online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust 
you because you were trustworthy with others before.”  In both cases past trustworthiness 
is a prerequisite for future transactions.  It is the information about reputation that enables 
trust by inducing a reciprocal response (Dellarocas, 2006; Hendershott, 2006).  Any 
undermining of the provided feedback’s validity or absence of negative feedback distorts 
the seller’s reputation and potentially exposes future buyers to exploitation by an 
opportunistic seller. 
     It is not easy to get feedback from buyers. Research on eBay’s feedback system shows 
buyers submits ratings on 41.8% to 52.1% of all transactions (Gregg & Scott, 2006; 
Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Wood, Fan, & Tan, 2002). Buyers may not be motivated to 
report evaluations or to do so honestly. In a case where the seller’s capacity to provide a 
service or goods is limited, then it is not in the buyer’s self-interest to make the 
information public.  An example is a serious collector’s reluctance to reveal a source for 
rare items. Buyers who want to be seen as “nice” may withhold negative evaluations in 
expectation of reciprocity. A seller’s threats of retaliation for negative feedback 
combined with explicit or implicit offers of rewards for positive feedback might lead 
buyers to submit reports that do not accurately reflect their experience. Clearly these 
factors are in effect as negative feedback for sellers by buyers on eBay occurs in less than 
1% of all transactions (Zhang, 2006). This contrasts with the substantially higher fraud 
rates reported to external entities like the National Consumers League Internet Fraud 
Watch; suggesting buyers are hesitant to leave negative evaluations ("Watch out for 
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cyber scrooge this holiday season," 2006). When an eBay buyer does give negative 
feedback, the seller gives negative feedback 34% of the time which indicates that 
retaliation may be occurring (Miller, Resnick, & Zeckhauser, 2003). 
     On eBay for each transaction the buyers and sellers can opt to appraise the other party 
by leaving feedback. Feedback consists of a positive, negative or neutral rating with an 
optional short comment ("What is feedback and how does it affect my reputation?," 
2010). The ratings are used to determine a member’s Feedback Score. With some 
exceptions - feedback works like this:  
• A positive rating increases the feedback score by one point. 
• A neutral rating leaves the feedback score the same. 
• A negative rating decreases the feedback score by one point. 
 
Feedback score is a number used to measure a member's reputation on eBay. A high 
feedback score means that a member has received a high number of positive ratings from 
other members. Every member of eBay has a feedback score. It can be found in 
parentheses next to their eBay userid (see Figure 1). Identifying information was redacted 
in this and other figures to protect the privacy of the eBay members. 
 
Figure 1.  eBay Feedback Score 
 
Clicking the feedback score enables access to a member's detailed Feedback Profile (see 
Figure 2). This includes recent feedback ratings, detailed seller rates, and feedback 
(rating plus optional comment) for each transaction with other members.   
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Figure 2.  eBay Member Feedback Profile 
 
     Feedback is publically viewable immediately after it is posted by either party. Neither 
party can change a feedback rating after it has been posted. There are very limited 
circumstances when eBay will consider allowing a change or removing a feedback rating 
and/or comment based on the eBay Feedback Abuse policy ("Feedback abuse," 2010). 
Sellers and buyers are able to hold feedback hostage by refusing to leave feedback until 
the opposite party has provided a report. For fraudulent transactions, this behavior could 
result in false feedback reports or no feedback provided altogether based on fear of 
retaliation (McDonald & Slawson Jr., 2002). Thus important information to the online 
auction community about the seller’s behavior can be lost.  
     Inexperienced eBay members are probably oblivious to the threat of feedback-
retaliation, but members who are experienced with online trading are sensitive and 
protective of their reputation. Experienced members consider the possibility of retaliation 
and take this into account when they make their decision of what feedback type to 
provide. Other than the possibility of feedback-retaliation exactly why a buyer should 
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care about feedback is not obvious. It is too simple to assume that buyers remain buyers 
forever as most eBay participants switch back and forth between the role of buyer and 
seller. A buyer has to be sensitive to feedback because it may effect future income as a 
seller. Sellers with higher ratings (better reputations) are able to sell products at a higher 
price then sellers with lower ratings (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2003). Buyers with a good 
reputation will not risk finding their bids cancelled due to a low feedback score. Negative 
feedback can have an adverse effect not just on the seller, but on both parties. 
     Studying online auction deception is problematic when using conventional methods as 
with other deviant behaviors the successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection.  
The degree of difficulty is compounded by the findings of  Zhang (2006) that eBay 
buyers provide 99% positive comments and 0.7% negative comments. As prior research 
studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates substantially higher than the 0.7% rate 
reported, the conclusion can easily be drawn that most buyers are opting to withhold 
reports of negative feedback.  The absence of negative feedback is problematic as it 
suggests a positive bias in feedback scores. This bias is borne out with the empirical 
observation that most eBay sellers have a reputation feedback scores that exceed 99%. 
Therefore analysis of numerical feedback scores for detection of opportunistic sellers is 
futile. 
     Building on the base issue of fraud, the research problem statement can be 
summarized as: 
Online auction fraud represents a serious threat to e-commerce and undermines online 
trust.  As fraud is pervasive, growing in use, and difficult to detect in online auctions; 
new techniques are needed for the early detection of opportunistic sellers.  
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     Excluding the use of feedback scores in online auctions for the detection of 
opportunistic sellers raised the following issues: 
• Are there other signatures that could potentially identify deception in an online 
auction transaction? 
• Can a new method be developed for the detection of opportunistic sellers by utilizing 
one of these signatures?  
• For any new signature – What are its limitations and predictive reliability? 
     An extensive forensic case study by Nikitov and Stone (2006) focused on modeling 
the behavior, attributes, and deception tactics of a single opportunistic seller who traded 
for eight years on eBay. Based on one of the case study findings, the concept of 
“negative-positive” type feedback appeared to be a candidate for a new signature to 
detect opportunistic sellers. The viability of the potential new signature along with 
determining its limitations and predictive reliability needed to be investigated; this 
investigation served as the premise for the research study. 
     Because of confidentiality rules, it was not possible for the Nikitov and Stone (2006) 
to acquire the case study’s subject member data directly from eBay. Instead, publicly 
available data from the eBay website was gathered – transactions, feedback ratings, 
feedback comments, and seller replies (to buyer feedback comments). This was 
supplemented by e-mail surveys and follow up interviews with buyers who had interacted 
with the seller.  The researchers acting anonymously in the role of buyer performed 
multiple transactions purchasing items to collect additional data on the seller’s behavior.   
     Nikitov and Stone (2006) findings confirmed the lack of negative feedback by buyers 
even after having a problematic or fraudulent experience with an opportunistic seller. The 
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majority of sellers obliquely or explicitly stated fear of feedback-retaliation (i.e. tit-for-
tat) as the reason for not leaving negative feedback on the seller. Several buyers (in 
escalated situations) indicated that the seller implied retaliation in e-mails should any 
complaint be made. Buyers that made negative feedback almost universally received 
retaliatory negative feedback from the seller. The most frequent response employed by 
the opportunistic seller to any communicated question or complaint was to use deception 
tactics to disarm, confuse or place the buyer on the defensive (see Figure 3). The 
deception tactics used were concealment strategies (masking, repackaging, dazzling, and 
red flagging) and simulation strategies (mimicking, inventing, decoying, and double-
play) (Johnson, Grazioli, & Jamal, 1993). 
 
Figure 3.  Example: Seller Using Decoying Deception Tactic in Response to Negative Feedback 
 
     The most interesting result from the forensic analysis of the opportunistic seller was a 
new discovery about buyers’ feedback data (feedback rating and feedback comment). 
Nikitov and Stone (2006) found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in 
positive feedback as a means of avoiding feedback-retaliation. They referred to this 
category of positive feedback as “negative-positive” type feedback. The concept of 
negative-positive type feedback is best understood by viewing a side-by-side comparison 
of positive, negative and negative-positive examples.   
This is an example of a typical positive feedback from a buyer (see Figure 4). 
9 
  
 
Figure 4.  eBay Sample Positive Feedback From Buyer 
 
 This is an example of a typical negative feedback from a buyer (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.   eBay sample negative feedback from buyer 
 
 This is an example of a typical negative-positive feedback from a buyer (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.   eBay Sample Negative-Positive Feedback From Buyer 
 
     Nikitov and Stone (2006) found that negative-positive feedback postings contained 
hidden signals to the buyer community about a problematic or fraudulent seller. The 
composition of negative-positive feedback included both positive and negative aspects of 
a transaction. Negative-positive complaints were usually in the formats of “I was pleased 
with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” or “I was unhappy about Y, but was 
pleased with X for the transaction.”  Typical examples are “Good product, but slow 
shipping” and “Took 7 days and 2 messages before replying to my email, but product was 
well packaged.”  
     In their forensic analysis, Nikitov and Stone (2006) viewed negative-positive feedback 
as a hidden signal to the buyer community about a seller; utilizing feedback content 
analysis they were able to expose indicators that the seller was potentially problematic or 
fraudulent.  Their research was limited to performing in-depth forensics analysis of a 
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single opportunistic seller. The concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature 
to identify potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population was never 
explored. This gap provided a narrowly scoped and tightly bounded area for research 
with a goal of the early detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use 
of negative-positive feedback. How to measure the success of using a negative-positive 
signature for indentifying opportunistic sellers is a little more problematic due to eBay 
confidentiality rules.  The implications of this problem are explored in the Methodology 
chapter along with a verification rationale and implementation techniques. 
     Feedback-retaliation has been explored as noted in prior citations by a multitude of 
academic research studies since the inception of eBay in 1995 (Bolton, Greiner, & 
Ockenfels, 2009; Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). The buyers at 
eBay have been vocal on issues about feedback policies through direct e-mail 
communication to the company and postings on discussion boards. In January 2008, eBay 
responded by announcing a fundamental change to the feedback system. Sellers could 
leave only positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That means buyers were free to leave 
negative feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation (Ambach, 2008). 
     Logically, buyers should have responded by providing negative feedback when 
appropriate.  Although the new policy has been in effect for over two years, the status 
quo remains – eBay still reports less than 1% negative feedback; most members have a 
99% or higher feedback rating; and the percentage of fraudulent transactions continues to 
rise (Gregg & Scott, 2008).  Obviously the number of opportunistic sellers is increasing 
and buyers are still reluctant to provide explicit negative feedback.  From this the 
conclusion can be drawn that buyers are continuing to use negative-positive feedback as a 
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means to signal the community about potentially opportunistic sellers. Ergo the ideal for 
early detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use of negative-positive 
feedback remains viable even under the modified feedback system.  
Relevance and Significance 
     Understanding and identifying occurrences of online deception is critical for 
increasing participation in online auctions and other forms of e-commerce, as victims of 
fraud will leave the online auction market and potential new customers withhold 
participation based on fear of becoming a fraud victim (Nikitkov, 2006; Pennington, 
Wilcox, & Grover, 2003).  
     Investigating online deception is important as deception in any form is the enemy of 
trust and some degree of trust is required for all business transactions (Grazioli & 
Jarvenpaa, 2000). Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create an illusion of 
trustworthiness to the buyers’ detriment. A goal of this research study was to help online 
buyers and online auction vendors to identify sellers who are unworthy of their trust. 
     According to the Federal Trade Commission, the number of consumer complaints 
about online auctions has been growing annually. Their latest report indicated that 89% 
of all Internet fraud complaints filed by the National Consumers League are related to 
online auctions ("Online auction fraud complaints still rising, says consumer watchdog," 
2004).  Losses due to fraud in online auctions range in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually. As with most type of frauds, a significant amount of fraudulent activity is never 
reported by the victims.  
     The size of the online auction market is immense, but difficult to pin down to a 
specific figure as many are privately held.  An idea of its scale can be drawn from eBay’s 
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2009 SEC Annual filing showing an income of $8,727,362,000 ("Form 10-K for eBay for 
2009," 2010). The 2009 IC3 Internet Crime Report found a 22% percent increase in 
Internet fraud complaints compared to 2008 (2009 Internet crime report, 2010). IC3 
reported that monetary losses from Internet fraud increased over 210% in the same time 
period rising from $264,600,000 in 2008 to $559,700,000 in 2009.   
Barriers and Issues 
    No matter how successful the research study for early detection of opportunistic 
sellers, efforts to deter fraud by developing new detection techniques function like a new 
military stratagem. The advantage will shift back and forth between the offense and the 
defense, depending on the adoption of new behaviors and technologies driven by how 
much each side gains if it wins. 
     Detection of negative-positive feedback by buyers required the examination, 
interpretation, and categorization of each buyer’s feedback comment text. As natural 
language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can be 
incomplete, and prone to errors in spelling and/or grammar; it was necessary to transpose 
the relevant written text into a formatted and coded structure. A coded structure provides 
data uniformity and enables automated analysis. Normally, the difficulty is designing an 
appropriate structure to capture all the components that could be found when performing 
the contextual analysis (Krippendorff, 1980). In this case, the design of the structure was 
greatly simplified by use of just two categorical codes. The absence of negative-positive 
feedback in a buyer’s feedback comment text was coded as N (No).  The presence of 
negative-positive feedback in a buyer’s feedback comment text was coded as Y (Yes). 
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     Studying online auction deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior the 
successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection.  An opportunistic seller will employ 
deception tactics in order to mask his/her behavior and illicit activities.  These deception 
tactics will include the use of concealment strategies (masking, repackaging, dazzling, 
and red flagging) and simulation strategies (mimicking, inventing, decoying, and double-
play) (Johnson, et al., 1993).  Although the objective of deception tactics is concealment 
or misdirection, the presence of deception tactics was used to advantage. The primary 
mode of communication between buyer and seller in an online auction is via written text. 
This text can take the form of internal correspondence - feedback comments and replies 
to feedback; or external correspondence via e-mail. Detecting the seller’s usage of 
deception tactics by examining the written texts provided corroborating evidence 
supporting the identification of a potential opportunistic seller found by using a negative-
positive signature. The textual communications were in natural language format with 
complex overtones and subtle nuances which precluded any easy method for 
representation in a coded structure. Automated textual analysis currently has limited 
capabilities and significantly less than a 100% rate of accuracy (Hijikata, Ohno, 
Kusumura, & Nishida, 2006; Lee, Jeong, & Lee, 2008).  Therefore, processing of these 
types of textual communications required human review and interpretation. Reducing the 
subjectivity of interpretation required evaluation of each communication by multiple 
reviewers and creation of evaluation rules for uniform results.  
     Because of confidentiality rules, it was not possible to acquire data directly from eBay 
on any members. Mimicking the actions of Nikitov and Stone (2006), publicly available 
data from the eBay website was gathered – transactions, feedback ratings, feedback 
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comments, and seller replies (to buyer feedback comments). It was possible to automate 
the mechanics for the data gathering process by using a spider-like program to crawl the 
eBay website and extract publicly available data. This technique has already been used 
successfully by multiple prior researchers (Almendra & Schwabe, 2009; Lucking-Reiley, 
Bryan, Prasad, & Reeves, 2007; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Zhang, 2006). 
     In a court of law the degree of difficulty and legal criteria to prove that a specific 
fraudulent action was performed is less than proving intention as in “intent to defraud.” 
Similarly developing a new method which shifted through prior transactions to identify 
potentially fraudulent activity that had occurred was significantly easier than attempting 
to predict fraudulent intent for items being offered in auction. Most opportunistic sellers 
for practical reasons employ a long-term strategy of exploiting multiple buyers over an 
extended period of time, rather than use a one-time “take the money and run” strategy 
(Nikitkov & Stone, 2006).  Two practical reasons are the increasing level of difficulty in 
setting up a new eBay userid and the time required to establish a “good” reputation. In 
order to deter fraud, eBay has continued to tighten the verification requirements for 
creation of new eBay userids and has improved detection of attempts to create multiple 
userids by one person. Therefore the new method took advantage of historical 
information and was forensic rather than predictive in design.  Even when using a 
forensic method, definitive labeling of an online auction member as an opportunistic 
seller was not possible. This was because confirmation was not available from the 
sources with authority – eBay or court rulings. What could be stated was that the specific 
member exhibited the behaviors and actions characteristic of an opportunistic seller and 
therefore had a high probability of actually being an opportunistic seller. 
15 
  
Definition of Terms 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) - A crowdsourcing system in which requesters post 
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) then workers do the HITs, submit the results, and 
receive a small payment ("Amazon Mechanical Turk," 2010). 
Buyer – A member who buys an item from a seller using the online auction ("eBay 
glossary," 2010). 
Category Listings – Items are organized by placement into predefined categories, 
subcategories, etc. Example category: Computers and Networking ("eBay glossary," 
2010) 
Feedback - For each transaction a buyer/seller can choose to leave an opinion about the 
other party’s performance for the transaction. Feedback is composed of two parts – a 
rating (Feedback Rating) and an optional text comment (Feedback Comment). A rating 
can be positive, negative or neutral ("About feedback," 2010). 
Feedback Comment – It is part of Feedback consisting of an optional text comment 
("About feedback," 2010). 
Feedback Profile - A webpage that shows all of a member's information – Feedback 
Score, Feedback Rating, Feedback Comments, list of items sold, etc. ("About feedback," 
2010) 
Feedback Rating – It is part of Feedback consisting of a rating which can be positive, 
negative or neutral ("About feedback," 2010).  
Feedback Score - Feedback score is a number (from zero to infinity) used to measure a 
member's reputation on eBay based on the total number of previous sales or purchases 
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that were given feedback by the other party ("eBay feedback scores, stars, and your 
reputation," 2010). 
Feedback Type – Also know as Feedback Rating. It can be positive, negative or neutral 
("About feedback," 2010).  
Feedback-Retaliation - Negative feedback that is left in response to negative feedback 
from the other party (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006). 
Fraud - Any act of deception carried out for the purpose of unfair, undeserved and/or 
unlawful financial gain. This term has been broadened for the purpose of the study as 
when the seller imposes a cost on the buyer for which other potential buyers should be 
aware of when considering purchasing from that seller (author). 
Gold Standard Data - Collection of preselected data that have a known set of answers  
produced by one or more individuals who are trusted and a domain expert (Sorokin & 
Forsyth, 2008). 
Human Intelligence Test (HIT) -  A task that a human requester asks a human worker to 
complete that is simple for a human to do and inherently difficult for a computer to do 
("Amazon mechanical turk requester best practices guide," 2010) 
Member – A person who has created a profile on the online auction website. A member 
has a userid and password for providing secure access to the online auction functions like 
buying or selling, review or leave feedback, or updating personal information ("eBay 
glossary," 2010). 
Negative-Positive Feedback – The use of embedded negative comments in positive 
feedback by a buyer as a means of avoiding retaliation from the seller (Nikitkov & Stone, 
2006). 
17 
  
Online auction – Is a business model in which members bid for products and services 
over the Internet. Example: eBay (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2004) 
Opportunistic seller - A person who attempts to negate online auction safeguards and 
exploit buyers for monetary gain (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006). 
Reputation – The culmination of feedback that a member receives in an online auction 
(Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006). 
Seller – A member who sells an item using an online auction ("eBay glossary," 2010). 
Transaction – Either a sale or purchase made by a member ("eBay glossary," 2010).  
Userid - A unique moniker or name used to identify a member of the online auction. 
Most online auctions allow the person to choice his/her own userid ("eBay glossary," 
2010). 
 Summary 
     Researching online auction deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior 
the successful perpetrator works hard to avoid detection.  An opportunistic seller will 
employ deception tactics in order to mask his/her behavior and illicit activities. The 
research study investigated if the presences of subtle buyer behavior in the form of 
negative-positive type feedback comments are an inter-buyer signal indicating that a 
seller is behaving fraudulently. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Reputation Systems  
     The corpus of this research concentrates on two areas of literature. The first is 
asymmetric information and second is reputation system design. Asymmetric information 
is a situation in which the seller knows relevant information about a product that the 
buyer does not know (Akerlof, 1970). This creates an imbalance of power in transactions 
which can sometimes cause a transaction to go awry (adverse selection) or make a buyer 
reluctant to risk engaging in a transaction (moral hazard). Reputation systems are used in 
online communities when a member has no prior knowledge or experience interacting 
with another member. In this type of situation, it is often helpful to make a decision 
whether or not to interact with a member based on the prior experiences of other 
members. Reputation system design as the name implies is the process of creating 
appropriate mechanisms to enable a reputation system to function effectively. 
     Asymmetric information regarding products or sellers has a major impact on market 
exchange which can result in a market collapsing or failing (Kauffman & Wood, 2000). 
Reputation and reputation mechanisms play an important role in reducing information 
asymmetry. These mechanisms facilitate buyer’s trust and reduce the risk from the 
community of sellers which enables buyer-seller transactions (Levine & Martinelli, 
1998). 
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     Each of the two asymmetric information models takes into consideration adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Reputation mechanisms have different roles in each of the 
two models. For adverse selection the role of a reputation mechanism is in helping the 
community to learn the initially unknown character (i.e. honesty) of a member 
(Dellarocas, 2003b). In a moral hazard setting, the objective of reputation mechanisms is 
promoting cooperative and honest behavior among sellers and buyers by the threat of 
future punishment (Shapiro, 1983). As Cabral (2004) stated, typical reputation 
mechanism models that incorporate reputations are based on Bayesian updating of 
beliefs. In other reputation models trust is modeled through repeated interaction and by 
the possibility of punishing inappropriate actions in a moral hazard setting (Diamond, 
1989).   
     In an online auction, a reputation system is the primary means to induce sellers and 
buyers to behave cooperatively. A reputation system’s mechanism enables future buyers 
to condition behavior on a seller's current actions. A reputation system can work as a 
feasible and less costly substitute for legal enforcement for online auctions (Bakos & 
Dellarocas, 2003). A reputation system serves as a proxy for the transactional history that 
would be developed between buyers and sellers over the succession of repeated 
interactions (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002).  
     Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) demonstrated the problems of low feed-back rates and 
potential reporting biases. Based on their work other researchers proposed mechanisms to 
solve these problems. One technique employed a monitoring mechanism. Ba, Whinston, 
and Zhang (2002) suggested a Trusted Third-party (TTP) mechanism which entailed 
issuing certificates to sellers and buyers. Dellarocas (2003b) proposed charging a listing 
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fee contingent on a seller's announced expected quality then rewarding the seller based on 
the announced quality compared to the posted rating by the buyer. Both mechanisms 
were designed to discourage sellers from lying about the true quality of a product. 
     A second mechanism design attempts to promote honest behavior and facilitate online 
auction transactions between sellers and buyers through peer-provided feedback. Miller, 
Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005) proposed a peer-prediction technique by comparing the 
likelihood assigned to a reference rater's possible ratings to the reference rater's actual 
rating.  Jurca and Faltings (2007), Papaioannou and Stamoulis (2005), and others 
proposed reward and punishment systems that induced both sellers and buyers to report 
truthfully. Two drawbacks to the feedback concept is failure of peers to respond 
truthfully and positive bias caused by the missing negative feedback as in Dellarocas and 
Wood (2008). 
     The third kind of mechanism accounted for the missing reports through a 
computational mechanism. Dellarocas and Wood (2008) designed a sophisticated 
computational mechanism to remedy distortions introduced by reporting bias. Their 
mechanism required buyers to take missing feedback into consideration. 
     A reputation system must meet three challenges. First, it must provide information 
that allows buyers to distinguish between trustworthy and non-trustworthy sellers. 
Second, it must encourage sellers to be trustworthy. Finally, it must have a mechanism to 
discourage participation from those who are not trustworthy (Resnick, Kuwabara, 
Zeckhauser, & Friedman, 2000). A number of empirical studies of eBay’s reputation 
mechanism have been conducted almost entirely focused on buyers’ response to 
published feedback. Multiple studies have estimated the regression of sale prices based 
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on seller feedback characteristics. Surveys containing these results can be found in Bajari 
and Hortaçsu (2004) and Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2006). The 
contributing factor of these studies is their tangential remarks about negative feedback – 
lack thereof, effects on sellers, effects on buyers, hints about retaliation, etc. 
     Analyzing eBay’s imperfect reputation mechanism has been the subject of much 
research. McDonald and Slawson (2002) noted that eBay’s reputation system revealed 
only a portion of a member’s private information due to some members’ unwillingness to 
provide feedback. eBay members have little incentive to leave feedback once a 
transaction has been completed and often they do not bother to do so. Members have 
incentives not to provide negative feedback when appropriate for fear of retaliatory 
feedback.  
     Cabral and Hortaçsu (2004) created a basic theoretical model of eBay’s reputation 
mechanism that featured both adverse selection and moral hazard. Their model suggested 
when in equilibrium a seller’s reputation was positively correlated with seller effort 
(honest sellers rewarded and opportunistic sellers punished). The authors’ model also 
suggested that sellers, specifically opportunistic sellers, had incentives to "buy" a 
reputation by engaging in purchases rather than sales. Cabral and Hortaçsu also noted that 
eBay’s feedback system though functional was not optimal.  
Feedback  
     Feedback comments from an online auction should be viewed as a narrative-textual 
representation of a user’s reputation. A single feedback type rating cannot capture all the 
information about a transaction as the impressions of buyers and sellers are typically 
nuanced. Assume for the moment that there are two buyers - one only moderately 
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satisfied regarding the purchase and another buyer ecstatic. Both buyers would normally 
select positive for feedback type because the transaction would have been perceived as 
positive. The feedback type of positive does not truly capture the essence of the 
transaction. A better understanding of the experiences of the buyers could be found by 
examining the text of their feedback comments. For example – moderately happy Buyer 
A might write “Product OK, but delivery slow.” While the ecstatic Buyer B might write 
“Great product and shipped fast!”  With a traditional numerical reputation system, Buyer 
A and Buyer B would be deemed identical in terms of their purchasing experience which 
not the case. Research into feedback comments provides insights into online auction 
transactions (Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006). 
     Prior research for online auctions include studies focused on the buyer response to 
published feedback. The interaction of sale price with buyers’ feedback types and 
feedback comments has been reviewed by multiple researchers including McDonald and 
Slawson (2002), Melnik and Alm (2002), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), and  Resnick, 
Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood (2006). Whether quantitative aggregate summary 
ratings (feedback score),  feedback type (i.e. negative, positive or neutral) or feedback 
comment (detailed text reviews), the consistent recommendation for managing reputation 
in online auctions is maximize the positive and minimize the negative for feedback type 
and comments (Melnik & Alm, 2002; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 
2002; Resnick, et al., 2006). It has been shown that negative information has a greater 
impact than positive information on buyers. This bias of focusing on negative comments 
and giving much greater weight to negative information in decision making has been well 
documented (Ofir & Simonson, 2001; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004; Weinberg & Davis, 
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2005). The finding of a negative bias only further emphasizes the importance of feedback 
in online auctions as feedback types and comments tend to be permanent or very long 
term. A typical example is eBay’s feedback policy which clearly states that feedback 
ratings and comments are generally a permanent part of a member’s Feedback Profile 
("About feedback," 2010). 
     One basic tenet of social psychology is people look to others for guidance in resolving 
uncertainty in their judgments (Festinger, 1954). Theoretically under the right 
circumstances individual judgment can be improved by listening to others. One of the 
most ancient techniques in human society to gather additional information from others is 
the use of word-of-mouth. Word-of-mouth is the most credible, objective, and influential 
means for exchanging feedback information and building trust since this type of 
communication among impartial buyers is unlikely to be biased or profit-driven (Kamins, 
et al., 1977). Reputation systems incorporate feedback to build artificial word-of-mouth 
networks in which individuals can share opinions and experiences (Resnick, et al., 2000).  
     The feedback mechanisms found in the reputation systems are changing people’s 
behavior in subtle but important ways.  Based on anecdotal evidence, people are now 
increasingly relying on opinions posted on reputations systems in order to make decision 
on selecting an honest seller, financial investments, and entertainment choices (Shirky, 
2008). Even if buyers have slightly different understandings of what constitutes honest 
seller behavior, it is possible to identify a broad set of feedback comments that a majority 
of buyers would agree conveys honest seller behavior (Pavlou, 2002). Evidence from 
prior research studies suggest people tend to rely on the opinions of others, even in the 
presence of their own personal information (Banerjee, 1992). A traditional auction relies 
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on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were trustworthy with me before.” An 
online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were 
trustworthy with others before.”  In both cases past trustworthiness is a prerequisite for 
future transactions.  It is the information about reputation that enables trust by inducing a 
reciprocal response (Dellarocas, 2006; Hendershott, 2006). 
Trust  
     Trust is an essential element in forming and maintaining commercial relationships 
(Nah & Davis, 2002). Trust is particularly challenging to develop in an online context 
like an online auction (Cofta, 2006). The converse of trust in the online auction 
environment is fraud. As a result trust and fraud have become important topics in online 
auction research. Lansing and Hubbard (2002) and Albert (2002) examined possible 
techniques to mitigate fraud through regulation. Bywell and Oppenheim (2001) 
recommended bidders be more aggressive in pursing fraud complaints against sellers. 
While fraudulent behaviors like competitive shilling, reserve price shilling, buy-back 
shilling, and false bidding have been investigated by researchers like Kauffman and 
Wood (2005) and Dong, Shatz, and Xu (2009).  
     For online auctions, trust translates to a good reputation in the form of positive 
feedback ratings and feedback comments. A seller’s poor reputation can deter buyers 
from participating in an auction (Brinkmann & Seifert, 2001).  There is conflicting 
research results on the effect of reputation on price paid.  Melnik and Alm (2002) and Ba 
and Pavlou (2002) showed a correlation of reputation score increasing with the price paid 
by a seller. While the latest research from Kauffman and Wood (2006) could not find any 
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significant effect of reputation on price. The conclusion is that there are other unknown 
factors which are increasing or reducing the effect of reputation on price. 
Fraud  
     The number of people being victimized by deceptive practices over the Internet 
continues to rise (Grazioli & Wang, 2001). Auction fraud is a problem that has been 
getting increasingly serious. The anonymity provided by online auctions may be fostering 
deception as the deceiver is able to disassociate himself/herself from the deceiving 
message (Bowker & Tuffin, 2003). On the Internet, high anonymity is possible making it 
difficult to assess identity and accountability regarding deception. On average the number 
of Internet frauds grew more than 250% annually (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003). The 
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) which was created by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the National White Collar Crime Center has received an increasing 
number of complaint submissions each year. 
     The limited research that has been conducted has been unable to suggest systematic 
approaches in detecting or preventing online auction fraud. Some researchers have 
categorized online auction fraud into different types, but they have not constructed any 
formalized methods to deal with them (C. Chua & Wareham, 2004). Work has been done 
in other research areas related to online auction fraud detection - reputation systems 
(Melnik & Alm, 2002; Resnick, et al., 2000; Resnick, et al., 2006), graph mining 
(Zacharia, Moukas, & Maes, 1999), and trust (Gyongyi, Garcia-Molina, & Pedersen, 
2004). 
     Research into feedback text comments is arguably more important than aggregate 
feedback ratings or scores because it can provide greater insights into the behavior and 
26 
  
character of sellers and buyers. However, it is only recently that research has been 
undertaken specifically on feedback text comments and their impact on reputation 
systems in online auctions (Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004; Bolton, Loebbecke and 
Ockenfels 2008; Dellarocas 2003; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002; Resnick et al. 2006).  
Consumers read and place significant weight on detailed reputation system elements in 
the feedback text comments found in a seller’s reputation feedback (Weinberg & Davis, 
2005).   This finding was supported by Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) who reported that 
buyer feedback text comments in online auctions had a greater impact on a seller’s 
credibility and benevolence than did aggregate “crude numerical” measures. They 
advised online auction members to attract outstanding (i.e. extremely positive) feedback 
text comments to avoid receiving abysmal (i.e. extremely negative) feedback text 
comments.  These research studies confirm the importance of feedback text comments 
and provide supporting evidence on the continued use, role, and value of negative-
positive feedback comments to buyers in online auctions. 
Textual Analysis  
     Contextual analysis is a systematic method for analyzing data in a standardized way 
(Weber, 1990). Contextual analysis can be applied to classify key ideas in any 
communication media – written, audio, and visual.  The term textual analysis is used 
when contextual analysis is applied to written communication. What makes the textual 
analysis technique powerful and effective is its use of coding and categorizing of the data 
(Krippendorff, 1980). Coding is the marking of words or text passages with alphanumeric 
codes. The codes are used to create categorical variables representing the original textual 
information. The resulting categorical variables can be analyzed using standard statistical 
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methods. One problem experienced by prior researchers working with feedback 
comments was finding a technique to extract nuances, inferences, and information from 
the provided textual data. The technique of choice by prior researchers to solve this 
problem was textual analysis. 
Summary 
     For online auctions a feedback system is the reputation mechanism used to facilitate 
buyer’s trust and reduce the risk from the community of sellers which enables buyer-
seller transactions.  Identifying online deception is important as deception in any form is 
the enemy of trust and some degree of trust is required for all business transactions. 
Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create an illusion of trustworthiness to the 
buyers’ detriment. The problem is that identifying sellers that exhibit fraudulent behavior 
is difficult as they constitute only a very small percentage of the entire online auction 
population and are elusive adapting their behavior to avoid detection. The issue with 
online auction fraud is further compounded as number of occurrences and resulting 
monetary losses has increased every year. As a result trust and fraud have become 
important topics in online auction research. 
     Research in online auction fraud is primary based on three methodologies – economic 
modeling, legal analysis, and analyses of online auction lists (Wood, 2004).  Analyzing 
the feedback ratings and comments provided by buyers on a seller in online auction lists 
is a common track taken by many prior researchers. Each succeeding group of 
researchers has applied ever more varied and sophisticated techniques using the feedback 
ratings and comments provided by buyers and sellers to analyze user interactions, user 
behavior, and attempt to identify potentially criminal activity. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
Preface 
     When conducting the research study, the initial plan was to use dedicated raters as 
evaluators and coders for the duration of the work to be done.  Based on best practices, a 
pilot test was performed to estimate the time required and cost of performing the 
research. The results of the pilot test indicated using the traditional method of dedicated 
raters was not viable due to the excessive time of 175 days and estimated cost of $37,152. 
An alternative method of crowdsourcing was found, determined to be viable, and used to 
perform the required work for the research study.  
     The pilot test was based on the methodology details for the dedicated raters. 
Significant portions of the alternative method of crowdsourcing were based on the 
methodology details for the dedicated raters.  As a result, the Methodology chapter 
contains details for both methods which are referenced accordingly as “initial plan” for 
using dedicated raters and “alternative plan” for crowdsourcing using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.   
Introduction 
     Research in online auction fraud is primary based on three methodologies – economic 
modeling, legal analysis, and analyses of online auction lists (Wood, 2004). The research 
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study focused on analyzing the feedback comments provided by buyers on a seller in 
online auction lists. The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of 
negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is 
behaving fraudulently. A diagram showing an overview of the research methodology can 
be found in Appendix A. 
Research Questions  
     The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research 
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question. 
     There is a need to determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently: 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
     If the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor 
that a seller is behaving fraudulently per RQ1, then need to determine if the number of 
negative-positive type feedback comments found for a given seller is a basis for the 
strength of the predictive relationship. The form of the predictive relationship could be 
linear or non-linear: 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does the number of negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
     Any patterns found in the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments in a 
seller’s transaction history could provide additional insights into seller and/or buyer 
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behavior; or be used to augment the accuracy of negative-positive type feedback 
comments as a predictor per RQ1:  
Research Question 3 (RQ3): For each seller will negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers fall into a pattern?  
Defining Fraud 
     This raises the question – What is fraudulent? The definition of fraudulent per the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary is "characterized by, based on, or done by fraud" 
("Merriam-Webster's collegiate dictionary," 2005). The online auction company eBay 
defines “fraud” as the seller’s failure to deliver the sold merchandise or the delivery of 
the item in physically bad condition ("eBay buyer protection plan," 2010). For this 
research study, fraud was defined in broader terms than eBay does. The terms 
"fraudulent" and "problematic” transaction were used interchangeably as any breach of 
the eBay User Agreement (contract) that comes at a cost to the buyer ("Your user 
agreement," 2010). If the seller ships an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing 
the buyer for the delay, late shipping constituted fraud. If merchandise differs from the 
item’s auction description in make, model or condition (i.e. used vs. new), the seller 
committed fraud. If the seller does not explicitly state that the item is not genuine (i.e. a 
copy), the seller committed fraud. If any deficit attributes of the product are not explicitly 
stated (i.e. headphones with a six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot 
cord), the seller committed fraud.  A fraudulent transaction does not exclusively mean 
that a seller collected the buyer’s money and then failed to ship the item. Fraud was 
viewed as the seller imposing a cost on the buyer for which other potential buyers should 
be aware of when considering purchasing from that seller.  
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    The logic behind broadening the definition of fraud as committed by an opportunistic 
seller becomes obvious once the content of feedback comments and anecdotal evidence 
of postings on eBay’s discussion boards are reviewed.  Although a seller’s action may not 
be a breach under the legal terms of the eBay User Agreement, buyers have shown that 
they are sensitive to any questionable action (or lack of action) by a seller. Broadening 
the definition of fraud was also supported as most complaints filed with the FTC as 
Internet auction fraud report problems are with sellers who fail to send the merchandise; 
send something of lesser value than advertised; fail to deliver in a timely manner; or fail 
to disclose all relevant information about a product or terms of the sale ("Online auction 
fraud complaints still rising, says consumer watchdog," 2004).  Similar to Nikitov and 
Stone (2006), the preliminary evaluation of feedback comments and postings on eBay’s 
discussion boards indicated that buyer complaints could be categorized as – product, 
shipping, communication, and other (non-specific).  
Research Design 
     The research study implemented a correlational research design using an automated 
data collection agent (Creswell, 2002). The research study required the extraction and 
analyzing of data that met predefined qualifying conditions from immense data sets. 
Manually sifting through data sets of this magnitude was not practical due to the time and 
labor required to extract the qualified data. Instead customized software in the form of an 
automated data-collection agent was used to search, locate, and extract the qualified data 
from the data set (Allen, Burk, & Davis, 2006). The objective of the research was to 
determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers 
(independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently (dependent 
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variable).  The correlational research design provided for discovering relationships 
between variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the 
discovered relationships predictions could be made. 
Selection of Research Design 
     There are two basic types of research - experimental research and non-experimental 
research. Each type of research answers different research questions and uses different 
research designs to collect data (Creswell, 2002).  Experimental research designs are 
composed of true experimental and quasi-experimental. Non-experimental research 
designs are composed of observational and correlational.  The selection of the non-
experimental correlative research design was primarily due to constraints which 
eliminated alternative research designs.  
     In the research study, a true experiment would violate ethical standards. The 
researcher wanted to determine if a buyer will leave negative-positive type feedback 
comments as an indicator that an opportunistic seller had behaved fraudulently. In the 
hypothetical true experiment, one would start with a sample population of sellers and 
divide them randomly into a treatment group (asked to make only fraudulent sales) and a 
control group (asked to make only honest sales). After a period of time making sales to 
the unaware buyers, the researcher would conduct a review of the buyer feedback 
comments for both seller groups. Needless to say, such an experiment would violate 
common ethical principles and criminal statutes.  
     A quasi-experimental design is one that looks like a true experimental design but lacks 
the key ingredients of manipulation and random assignment. The most commonly used 
quasi–experimental design is non-equivalent groups design. Due to the source of data 
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(extracted from website pages) and type of data (historical transaction logs), it is 
impossible to perform the required pre-test, treatment, and post-test for this research 
design. Other researchers like Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), Brown, Forin and Rhodes 
(2009), and Kauffman and Lee (2009) have used crawlers to collect data from website 
pages, performed online auction focused research, and explicitly declared their research 
design as quasi-experimental. However, upon closer examination the term quasi-
experimental could only be loosely applied as all the required components – pre-test, 
treatment, and post-test were not present. 
     Non-experimental designs are used to describe, differentiate, or examine associations, 
as opposed to direct relationships, between or among variables, groups, or situations. 
There is no random assignment, control groups, or manipulation of variables, as these 
designs use observation only. The most common non-experimental designs are 
observational and correlational studies. 
     The observational design is based on gathering detailed information about behavior. 
Typically this is done by direct or indirect visual observation by the researcher of the 
study subjects. As the data source was website pages and type of data was historical 
transaction logs, there was no observable behavior rendering this research design moot.  
     A correlational research design focuses on investigating the existence and the degree 
of a relationship between two or more quantitative variables. If two variables are highly 
related, values of one variable could be used to predict values on other variable. The 
objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive type 
feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. The 
definition and functionality of the correlational research design made it the optimum 
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choice for the research study. Selecting and combining the correlational research design 
with a data collection agent provided another advantage as analyzing only a subset of all 
available data increases the validity of the resulting conclusions, provided that the subset 
of data is based on tightly defined and narrow conditions. The extracted subsets can 
provide evidence for stronger conclusions regarding causality than uninformed analysis 
of the entire data set (Creswell, 2002). 
Limitations of Correlational Research Design 
     The correlational research design does provide the ability to detect patterns or 
relationships among variables (i.e. Is X related to Y?).  Relationships between variables 
are discovered through the use of correlational statistics.  These relationships could be 
linear or non-linear in form. The correlation coefficient can provide a measure of the 
degree and direction of relationship. From the discovered relationships predictions can be 
made. 
     Correlational research design will not identify the causes or reasons for the observed 
behavior. This is because a correlational relationship between variables could be the 
result of an outside source. Based on this possibility, it must be understood that the 
correlation does not necessarily explain cause and effect. Hence the maxim – 
Correlational does not equal causation (Aldrich, 1995).   
     Under certain conditions, it may be possible to have a high degree of confidence that 
there is causality between two variables. Determining the direction of causality can be 
difficult or impossible to quantify. Casual direction can be hinted if information about 
time is available. This is because a cause must precede its effects under classic 
Newtonian physics and natural laws. The type of data to be used is time-stamped 
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historical transaction logs which provide the possibility of indicating the direction of 
causality. 
Data Collection 
     Prior published research investigating online auction fraud generally started by 
identifying two groups of sellers based on their historical behavior pattern - fraudulent or 
honest. In the research study, the sample population was obtained by using an automated 
data collection agent crawling over the eBay website.  
     The optimum means to secure data for research would be having it directly supplied 
by the company which is the source for the study – eBay. Unfortunately, eBay will not 
provide data upon request to researchers. Prior researchers have also experienced this 
problem and resorted to either manually collecting the data or using an automated data 
collection agent (i.e. web crawler or spider).   
     An Application Programming Interface (API) is an interface implemented by a 
software program to enable interaction with other software or a website. It is not 
uncommon for commercial companies to provide APIs to allow other companies to 
interact with their website for product availability, pricings queries, place purchase 
requests, etc. Providing APIs allows the target company to control access, optimize 
usage, and throttle dataflow. APIs are a recently available option for eBay, but have 
several issues that precluded their use ("Advanced research API," 2010). Although the 
eBay API software is free, usage based on number of API calls is metered and charged 
appropriately. The second issue is that the eBay APIs are limited in functionality as to 
what data can be retrieved.  As the data collection process would require hundreds of 
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thousands of API calls and possibly need to be repeated multiple times, the cost would be 
prohibitable.   
     The option most frequently chosen by prior researchers like Bapna, Goes, Gupta and 
Jin (2004); Clemons, Hann and Hitt  (2002); Easley and Tenorio (2004); Palmer (2002); 
and Pavlou and Gefen (2004) was using a web crawler. A web crawler is a software 
program that accesses a website and traverses through the site by following the links 
present on the web pages. Although commercial web crawlers are available, their cost 
and limited functionality forces most researchers to build a custom web crawler.  
     The custom automated web crawler used in this research study was written in Java 
object-oriented programming language. The web crawler was specifically designed for 
the eBay website to retrieve web pages, parse the webpage to find the required data, 
determine if the found data met the selection criteria, and store the qualified data for later 
analysis in a Comma Separated Variable (CSV) ASCII file. Details on the web crawler 
design for this research study can be found in Appendix B. 
     There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to using an automated data collection 
agent compared to performing the task manually. An advantage of using an automated 
data collection agent is the reduction of human error in the data collection process. 
Agents collect more qualified data in a significantly shorter period of time then possible 
manually.  One disadvantage is that large quantities of superfluous or irrelevant data can 
be collected – this was avoided by defining very specific constraints for qualifying data. 
Constructing a custom automated data collection can be a complex and time consuming 
programming task depending on the data to be collected and the dispersion of data over 
multiple linked web pages. There are potential legal issues of copyright in collecting data 
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(Winn, 2005) or having an agent cause the equivalent of denial-of-service attack on a 
website due to its processing demands (Mierzwa, 2005).  eBay has pressed legal suits 
against commercial companies for using automated data collection agents, but to date has 
not restricted personal or research based use of automated data collection agents ("eBay, 
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc," 2000). 
How Much Data to Collect on Each Seller 
     Prior research shows that recent feedback is the most influential on online auction 
buyers and also indicated buyers rarely examine feedback text comments beyond the first 
webpage (Dellarocas, 2003b). Nikitkov and Stone (2006) found that opportunistic sellers 
for practical reasons employ a long-term strategy of exploiting multiple buyers over an 
extended period of time. Based on these two behavior patterns, it should be possible to 
predict buyers will repeatedly be “caught” by opportunistic sellers as evidence of 
previous fraudulent actions are “hidden” from any prospective buyer’s view as they roll 
off the first webpage. From this it could be surmised that one characteristic for 
identifying a typical opportunistic seller is multiple occurrences of negative-positive 
feedback in his/her transaction history.  Extrapolating on above suppositions, the multiple 
occurrences of negative-positive type feedback comments should result in a “bunching” 
or “clustering” pattern.  The actual existence of a pattern and its construct was 
investigated per the previously stated RQ3: For each seller will negative-positive type 
feedback comments from buyers fall into a pattern? The forensic method of the research 
study required the examination of a seller’s entire transaction history in order to identify 
any pattern. Therefore, the entire transaction history was collected for each qualified 
seller. 
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Data Selection 
     The correlational research design provides for discovering relationships between 
variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the discovered 
relationships predictions can be made. In the case of the research study – it was used to 
explore if there is a relationship between the presence of negative-positive type feedback 
comments by eBay buyers (independent variable) and eBay sellers identified as behaving 
fraudulently (dependent variable). The collected data was separated into two groups 
based on the characteristic of the seller’s behavior - honest and fraudulent. 
     The data sets behind the eBay website contain immense quantities of data currently 
reported to exceed two petabytes ("eBay’s two enormous data warehouses," 2010). The 
most recent numbers for eBay are from 2009 and show active registered users currently 
total 90,000,000 ("Form 10-K for eBay for 2009," 2010).  Combine this with the fact that 
fraudulent sellers constitute a minuscule number of the active registered users, raises 
some obvious questions.  What size sample population is needed? How can the 
probability be increased that the sample population includes multiple fraudulent sellers? 
     In order to build a sample population that contains sellers that behave honestly and 
fraudulently, choosing the sellers randomly would not work as the probability of finding 
even a single seller that behaves fraudulently (i.e. opportunistic seller) would be very 
small.  Exactly how small can been seen by the 0.01 percent officially reported by eBay  
(B. Cox, 2003; Konrad, 2005). The number only rises to 0.20 percent based on a research 
study of eBay fraud by Gregg and Scott (2008). Nor does it appear that fraudulent sellers 
are evenly distributed across the thousands of sales categories available on the eBay 
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auction site. The distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed and focused on 
specific categories.  
     Prior researchers have determined which specific eBay sales categories have the 
highest incidents of fraudulent sales (See Figure 7). Of particular interest is the 
Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks category where one research 
study found three-quarters of the survey respondents did not receive their computer or it 
arrived damaged (Gavish & Tucci, 2008).  
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www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/AuctionFraudReport.pdf. 
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customer feedback and risk " Journal of Operations Management 25(5): 985-997. 
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Figure 7.  Prior Research on eBay Sales Categories  
 
     Which raises the question - Why is the skewed distribution of fraudulent sellers of any 
interest?  A brief analogy will help answer this. Imagine hunting for a single needle in a 
very large haystack. Odds are you either will not find the needle or have to invest 
considerable time and effort to find it. How can you improve your odds of finding a 
needle? The optimum answer requires adopting two strategies. First – search a smaller 
haystack that purportedly has a needle in it (i.e. reduced solution space).  Second - 
increase your odds by finding a smaller haystack purportedly with multiple needles in it 
(i.e. increase probability). Substituting needle with fraudulent seller and haystack with 
sample population, the solution becomes obvious. Target the data selection process on 
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extracting a sample population from a given eBay sales category that has been 
demonstrated to contain a high number of potentially fraudulent sellers. For the research 
study, the targeted eBay sales category used was Computers and Networking: PC 
Laptops and Notebooks. 
     Dr. Floyd, a fictional character in the book 2010: Odyssey Two by Author C. Clark 
(1983), said "Once is an accident; twice is a coincidence; three times is a conspiracy." 
Based on a similar sentiment, one final step needed to be done to refine the data selection 
process. A seller with a sales history showing a single sale in the Computers and 
Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks category was more likely cleaning out a closet 
rather than engaging in fraud.  Repeated sales transactions by a seller in the category 
demonstrate the difference between a casual seller and being in the business of selling 
laptops either legitimately or fraudulently. A seller needs to have a track record in the 
form of a sufficiently sized feedback history to provide for an accurate categorization of 
the seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent. Using the same initial data selection criteria 
as that of Finch (2006), the initial plan was for sellers with a feedback score lower than 
600 be excluded. A feedback score of 600 means that a seller had a minimum of 600 
sales in all categories, but given the feedback response rate of 48.9% to 59.2% will have 
a higher actual number of sales (Gregg & Scott, 2006; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; 
Wood, et al., 2002). 
     Should the resulting retrieved population size proved too small compared to the 
required data sample size, the initial plan was to rerun the automated data collection 
agent after adjusting the feedback score threshold filter.  This process would be repeated 
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as often as necessary until an appropriately sized data sample population size was 
obtained. See Appendix A for a diagram of the research methodology.   
Determining Data Sample Size 
     The initial plan’s sampling method was representational.  Yamane (1967) provides a 
simplified formula to calculate sample sizes (See Figure 8). Where n is the sample size, N 
is the population size, and e is the level of precision: 
 
Figure 8.  Sample Size Formula 
 
An example of how this sample size formula would be used is shown in Figure 9. For 
demonstration purposes, let it be said that 2000 unique sellers were found listed in the 
Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks classification. A 95% 
confidence level and p = 0.5 are assumed. 
 
Figure 9.  Example Calculation Using Sample Size Formula 
 
Data Validity 
     There are two major threats to validity – internal threats and external threats. Internal 
validity threats are experimental procedures, treatments or subject experiences that 
threaten a researcher’s ability to correctly draw inferences from study population. 
External validity threats are the result of the researcher incorrectly drawing inferences 
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from the data to other settings (conditions) or apply it to past or future events. Each of 
these threats to validity were addressed in the methodology for the research study. 
Correlational studies are higher than true or quasi-experiments on external validity but 
lower on internal validity (Creswell, 2002). 
External Validity 
     External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized 
to a larger population. While true experiments have higher internal validity as they are 
internally consistent what is sacrificed is the ability to generalize to the real world. The 
non-experimental correlational research design achieves external validity through the 
generalization to the studied population which in this case was the large (in the millions) 
eBay auction site membership.  As the auctions collected were selected on product 
category, the auction sellers and buyers could not be selected a priori. 
Internal Validity 
     Internal validity of a study establishes that the data or findings are true or measures 
what is purported to be measured (Borg & Gall, 2006). Measurement error must be 
minimized and the instruments for data collection must be trusted to ensure internal 
validity.  
     Measurement error is the discrepancy between the observed value of a measurement 
and the true value due to the error contained in the measuring instrument. Any 
measurement error would be analyzed using statistical calculations. As a web crawler 
was the instrument for data collection, the data collection procedure could be repeated 
and results compared to prove replication and reliability.  
43 
  
     Internal validity can also refer to the extent which variation in the dependent measure 
can be attributed exclusively to the independent variable. This is especially true in the 
case of the experimental research designs where the independent variable is directly 
manipulated in the treatment group, but not changed in the control group. In the research 
study, the initial plan’s focus was on locating sellers with a large number of sales in order 
to have the maximum number of buyer feedback comments to evaluate.  Sampling would 
be random based on “n” sellers with a feedback score greater than or equal to the filter 
threshold number where “n” will be the suggested sample size for the given population. 
The initial plan’s sampling technique would duplicate that previously used by Finch 
(2006). Assignment to group – based on seller’s behavior (honest or fraudulent) –  would  
take place in a post-selection process when the seller was categorized by the evaluators. 
Thus the selection of sellers would be blind as to group. 
Reliability 
     Inter-rater agreement, inter-rater reliability, or concordance is the degree of agreement 
among raters. Inter-rater agreement is used to measure reliability. Inter-rater agreement is 
estimated based on the correlation of scores in the ratings of two or more observers 
(raters) assigned to reviewing each behavior or observation. Two independent groups of 
raters were used – evaluators and coders. Details for each type of rater are specified in the 
appropriate sections describing the purpose, function, training, etc. In the initial plan 
Cohen’s Kappa was to be used to assess inter-coder agreement among the raters. The 
Kappa provides an estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’ 
observations or scores.  Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the 
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proportion of agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett, 
2007).  
     The alternative method which used crowdsourcing prevented the measuring of inter-
rater reliability with Cohen’s Kappa. This was because raters were randomly and 
anonymously assigned to each work unit known as a Human Intelligence Test (HIT). 
Instead the techniques of multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum 
work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing were used to ensure the 
reliability of raters.  These techniques are detailed in a later section entitled Building the 
Prototype HITs for Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Sources of the Variables 
     The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive 
type feedback comments by buyers is a indicator (predictor) that a seller is behaving 
fraudulently (observed behavior). The correlational research design provides for 
discovering relationships between variables, measuring the degree and direction of 
relationships, and from the discovered relationships predictions can be made.  
     In terms of the correlational research design mechanics, the focus of the research 
study was determining if there is a relationship [hereafter called the primary relationship] 
between “negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers” and “a seller behaving 
fraudulently.” If the primary relationship existed, then the next step was measuring the 
degree and direction of the primary relationship (if possible).  The remaining step was to 
determine if predictions could be made based on the primary relationship. 
      In the research study, both of the variables in the primary relationship are abstracted 
from the collected public eBay data. Presence or absence of a negative-positive type 
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feedback was derived by coders reviewing the Buyer Feedback Type field (which must be 
positive) and Buyer Feedback Comment field’s text format. The output from each of the 
three coders was placed into separate fields - Negative-Positive 1, Negative-Positive 2, 
and Negative-Positive 3. The Negative-Positive fields are categorical containing one of 
the following values – Y (Yes) or N (No).  Based on majority rule, a final inter-coder 
agreed value was assigned to the Negative-Positive Consensus field. 
     The seller’s behavior – honest or fraudulent – was derived by the evaluators’ 
judgments of the seller’s behavior based on all the available eBay public data and using a 
predefined criterion for what is fraudulent behavior. Each of the evaluators was asked to 
answer the following key question for each seller – Is the seller exhibiting fraudulent type 
behavior? The answer was either “No” the seller is not acting fraudulently (i.e. honest 
behavior) or “Yes” the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e. fraudulent behavior).  
     After a seller has been reviewed by all evaluators, the answer from each of the three 
evaluators was placed into separate fields - Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1, Fraudulent-
Type Behavior 2, and Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3. The Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields 
are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based on 
majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields’ ratings, a final inter-
evaluator agreed value of N or Y was assigned to the Fraudulent-Type Behavior 
Consensus field. 
Independent Variable 
     The independent variable (predictor) is typically the variable being manipulated or 
changed and the dependent variable is the observed result of the independent variable 
being manipulated. For this research study, the independent variable was indicated by the 
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presence or absence of negative-positive type feedback in the Buyer Feedback Comment 
field. The Negative-Positive Consensus field was the independent variable.  
Dependent Variable 
     The dependent variable is the event studied and expected to change whenever the 
independent variable is altered. The observed phenomenon was the type of seller 
behavior – honest or fraudulent - experienced by the buyer.  The Fraudulent-Type 
Behavior Consensus field was the dependent variable. 
Data Record Layout 
     In order for the data collection agent to perform its function of  parsing and extracting 
data from the eBay web pages, exactly what data needed to be collected had to be clearly 
defined.  One of the steps in the methodology required evaluators to make a judgment of 
classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent. Naturally, the evaluators 
wanted to review all the available data about a seller before forming an opinion. Even if 
not used as part of the data analysis, one advantage of collecting the additional data was 
that it might prove valuable in future research studies. Alternatively, unexpected events 
or relationships could be uncovered when using the additional data. 
     See Appendix C for details on the data record layout. Detailed for each data field are 
name, description, type, size, format, and comments. The eBay webpage source for each 
data field can be found detailed in the crawler design (see Appendix B). For ease of 
performing statistical analysis, only a single flat data file was created and seller data 
fields were duplicated in every record (i.e. a sales transaction with buyer feedback).  
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Data Obfuscation 
     Although the data collected was in the public domain, maintaining anonymity was still 
a requirement. The first potential issue was preventing the coders from being effected by 
any personal knowledge that they might have of an eBay seller’s or buyer’s identity via 
their eBay userid. For example – Do not want a coder saying, “Hey that’s my sister’s 
eBay userid!”  The second potential issue was to prevent any bias by the coders based on 
any other extraneous data. For example - an eBay userid that is political (HEILHITLER) 
or derogatory (SLUTTYGIRL).   Every eBay auction has a unique Item Number to 
identify the item being offered for sale. Each collected record detailed a single purchase 
by a buyer from a qualified seller with a corresponding Item Number uniquely identifying 
the auction. In order to prevent the possibility of a coder looking up information about an 
item using the Item Number, it was masked with a system generated autonumber field 
named Feedback Number. As coders only had access to the content of two fields 
[Feedback Number, Buyer Feedback Comment], this isolated the coders and ensured that 
no extraneous data effected how they performed their task.   
     The situation was reversed with evaluators as no data obfuscation needed to be taken. 
Evaluators needed to make a judgment in classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or 
fraudulent. The evaluators wanted to review all the available data about a seller before 
forming an opinion. An evaluator was required to indicate any personal knowledge of a 
seller or buyer in the Other Comments section of the Evaluator Worksheet (see Appendix 
D). As no evaluator indicated any personal knowledge of a seller or buyer, it was not 
necessary for the researcher to review and determine what corrective action needed to be 
taken in the case of personal knowledge by an evaluator.  
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Identifying Fraudulent Sellers 
     There are only two sources with authority that can equitably state an eBay member is 
a fraudster – eBay and criminal court rulings. Due to confidentiality, eBay will not 
provide any details to third-parties on complaints against a member or indicate why a 
member’s account was suspended or disabled.  Therefore, an explicit confirmation that a 
specific online auction member was an opportunistic seller from the primary source – 
eBay - was not available.  Observing the public actions of eBay –like suspending a 
member’s account – did provide a secondary source from which some inferences could 
be drawn.  
     The probability that a person who commits a fraudulent act will be caught and 
prosecuted is very low. The execution of a fraudulent act often leaves the victim unaware 
it has taken place or too embarrassed to report it.  The covert nature of fraud makes 
collecting sufficient evidence for prosecution and conviction time consuming and 
difficult.  Nonviolent crime like online auction fraud has a lower priority with law 
enforcement agencies than violent crime against people or damage to property. 
Even when a fraudster is caught and prosecuted, the person often receives a light 
sentence or no sentence in return for restitution to the victims (C. Chua & Wareham, 
2004). The result is the criminal court record containing formal prosecutions for online 
auction fraud are very limited in number. In addition, the court records could be sealed 
preventing public access to the details or not current enough to extract data from eBay as 
it can take years for a final legal verdict to be reached. 
     Studying online deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior the successful 
perpetrators work hard to avoid detection (Kauffman & Wood, 2000; Nikitkov & Stone, 
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2006).  An opportunistic seller will employ deception tactics in order to mask his/her 
behavior and illicit activities.  What can be done is quantifying the perception by others 
that a specific online auction member exhibits the behaviors and actions characteristic of 
a fraudulent seller.  Based on the quantified perceptions, an inference can be drawn that a 
specific online auction member is behaving fraudulently. The technique of using 
inferences from secondary sources to indicate an individual’s probability of being an 
opportunistic seller was done in prior research by Chua and Wareham (2008), Chua, 
Wareham and Robey (2007), and Pandit, Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007). 
     All secondary sources can only make inferences or statements without being definitive 
that an eBay member is behaving fraudulently. The relative measure of weight for an 
inference or statement varies based on the secondary source.  For example - A single 
complaint message posted about a seller by one buyer on the eBay discussion board 
would have a lower weight than an investigative news reporter’s article on an eBay 
member’s potentially fraudulent acts. A single buyer’s posting must be considered an 
opinion.  Whereas an investigative reporter would be held to a higher standard with the 
expectation of being objective, confirming any facts presented, and responsibility as the 
reporter (or the publisher) could be taken to court for liable. However, the relative 
measure of weights can be variable for any given secondary source.  Imagine the 
situation where multiple buyers instead of a single buyer posted complaint messages 
about a seller on the eBay discussion board. With a number of buyers making a complaint 
against a single seller, it raises the probability that the seller is engaged in fraudulent 
behavior (Surowiecki, 2004). The relative measure of weight for each secondary source 
was not a primary factor in this research.  The constraint that must be remembered is 
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secondary sources are not definitive and any findings must be held with that limitation in 
mind. An example of mistakenly treating secondary sources as authoritative and 
definitive can be found in the study of Pandit et al. (2007). In their study a statement was 
made - “Through manual investigation (Website browsing, newspaper reports, etc) we 
located 10 users who were guaranteed fraudsters” (Pandit, et al., 2007, p. 207). Using 
secondary sources, a judgment based on the available evidence can be made with a 
degree of confidence that a specific online auction member as a seller is behaving in an 
honest or fraudulent manner. No secondary source can be used to definably state or label 
an eBay member as a guaranteed fraudster. 
Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent 
     Studying online deception is problematic when using conventional methods as with 
other deviant behaviors the successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection.  By 
developing explicit rules to distinguish between honest and fraudulent seller behavior, it 
was possible to appropriately and constantly categorize a seller’s behavior as honest or 
fraudulent. 
     In the initial plan, a minimum of three evaluators (who were unaware of the study’s 
purpose) would be recruited and would each review all the sellers. An evaluator would be 
required to make a judgment classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent.  
Which raises the question – On what criteria will the evaluators base their judgment? 
     As human behavior is complex and sometimes inconsistent, attempting to find a single 
specific behavior pattern to signal fraudulent behavior is not realistic. Taking a clue from 
prior research into credit card fraud, online auction fraud detection is based on looking 
for red flags and behavior patterns (Bhargava, Zhong, & Lu, 2003).  The mechanical 
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process of going through a long checklist of all the potential red flags and behavior 
patterns for even a single seller would be time consuming and any lapse by an evaluator 
could result in a misclassification. As the number of sellers that would need to be 
reviewed appeared to be in the hundreds, it would not be feasible to perform the task 
entirely manually. Nor is there an automated means for making the required judgment. 
     Fortunately, there was a publicly available software application that automatically 
searched for red flags and suspect behavior patterns in eBay auctions. The Auction 
Inquisitor software checks an eBay auction for over 200 common and not-so-common 
signs of fraud plus checks the seller's history,  and finishes by presenting a report of the 
results with comments (Ford, 2010). Using Auction Inquisitor as a front end for the 
evaluation process provided the following advantages – greatly reduced the time required 
to review the red flags and suspect behavior patterns for a seller; enabled the review 
process to be performed consistently and without human error; and presented the results 
in a summarized and standardized format.  It must be made clear that the Auction 
Inquisitor software did not make a judgment as to whether or not a seller’s behavior was 
fraudulent. It only presented its findings in the form of a standardized summary report. 
     In the initial plan, each evaluator was to watch a training video on how to use the 
Auction Inquisitor software application. A copy of the Evaluator Worksheet would be 
provided to each evaluator (see Appendix D) and reviewed with the researcher.  The 
Evaluator Worksheet summarized the rules for what behaviors are deemed as fraudulent 
for the research study (see prior section on Definition of Fraud). The procedure for 
performing the seller evaluation is detailed in Appendix E. Ten preselected sellers would 
be used for training to ensure that the evaluators experienced the full range of seller 
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behaviors and understand the criterion for fraudulent behavior. The evaluators would be 
physically separated in order to ensure that they worked independently. Each of the 
evaluators would be asked to answer the following question for each seller – Is the seller 
exhibiting fraudulent type behavior? The answer would be either “No” the seller is not 
acting fraudulently (i.e. honest behavior) or “Yes” the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e. 
fraudulent behavior).  Upon successful completion of the training, the evaluators would 
start work on the actual experimental data. Presentation of the sellers to each evaluator 
would be random. After a seller was reviewed by all evaluators, the answer from each 
evaluator would be placed into separate fields - Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1, Fraudulent-
Type Behavior 2, and Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3. The Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields 
are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based on 
majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields’ ratings, a final inter-
evaluator agreed value of N or Y would be assigned to the Fraudulent-Type Behavior 
Consensus field. 
     In the initial plan, validity and reliability would be addressed by the following 
methods. The author of the research proposal would evaluate a random sample set of 
sellers independently and compare the results with those of the evaluators. This reliability 
method has been deemed as the most accurate by Kolbe and Burnett (1991) and has been 
used for textual analysis in prior research studies. Next Cohen’s Kappa would be used to 
assess inter-evaluator reliability among the evaluators who were assessing fraudulent 
behavior among sellers. In each case one person who was observing the situation 
(assessing fraudulent behavior among sellers) was an indicator. The Kappa would 
provide an estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’ 
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observations or scores.  Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the 
proportion of agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, et al., 2007).  One Kappa would 
compare the fraudulent-type behavior between evaluator 1 and evaluator 2; one Kappa 
would compare evaluator 1 with evaluator 3; and one Kappa would compare evaluator 2 
with evaluator 3.   For inter-evaluator agreement, the majority ratings would be used (two 
out of three) to code Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus as N (No) or Y (Yes). 
 Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive or Not 
     In a forensic case study of an opportunistic seller, it was found buyers sometimes 
embed negative comments in positive feedback as a means of avoiding retaliation from 
sellers and damage to their reputation. This category of positive feedback is described as 
“negative-positive” feedback (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006). An example of negative-positive 
feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping”.  The objective of the research was to 
determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is an 
indicator that a seller is acting fraudulently. In order to meet this objective, the Buyer 
Feedback Comment for every buyer needed to be reviewed and coded in order to identify 
all the negative-positive feedbacks. As negative-positive feedback requires that the Buyer 
Feedback Type be positive, any Buyer Feedback Comment that has Buyer Feedback Type 
other than positive was filtered out as it did not need to be evaluated by the coders. 
     In the initial plan, a minimum of three coders (who were unaware of the study’s 
purpose) would be recruited and would each review all the buyer feedback comments. A 
coder would be required to make a judgment to classify a Buyer Feedback Comment as 
being in negative-positive format or not by assigning a value to the Negative-Positive 
field as Y (Yes) or N (No).   
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     The criteria required for the coder’s judgment would be minimal. eBay only provides 
for three types of feedback - negative, neutral, and positive. A subset of positive feedback 
would be flagged by the coders as negative-positive if it met one of the formats - “I was 
pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” [+X, -Y] or “I was unhappy 
about Y, but was pleased with X for the transaction” [-X, +Y].  A diagram of the coder 
procedure can be found in Figure 10. As eBay Feedback Type is restricted to the value of 
negative, neutral or positive; invalid feedback types were not present. Seller auction sales 
without a feedback type do not appear in an eBay seller’s transaction history and 
therefore were not collected or require review. 
 
Figure 10.  Flowchart of Coder Procedure 
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     In the initial plan, each coder would receive and review with the researcher a copy of 
the Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive document (see 
Appendix F).  This document summarized the rules for classifying buyer feedback 
comments as negative-positive or not. A preselected sample of 100 buyer feedback 
comments would be used for training to ensure that coders experienced the full range of 
seller feedback comments and understood the criterion for classification as negative-
positive type feedback or not.  The coders would be physically separated in order to 
ensure that they worked independently. Each of the coders would be asked to answer the 
following question for each buyer feedback comment – Does the buyer feedback 
comment meet the criterion for negative-positive type feedback? The answer would be 
either “No” does not qualify as negative-positive type feedback or “Yes” does qualify as 
negative-positive type feedback.  Upon successful completion of the training, the coders 
would start work on the actual experimental data. Presentation of the buyer feedback 
comments to each coder would be random. After a buyer feedback comment was 
reviewed by all coders, the answer from each coder would be placed into separate fields - 
Negative-Positive 1, Negative-Positive 2, and Negative-Positive 3. The Negative-Positive 
fields are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based 
on majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Negative-Positive fields’ ratings, a final inter-coder 
agreed value of N or Y would be assigned to the Negative-Positive Consensus field. 
     In the initial plan, validity and reliability would be addresses by the following 
methods. The author of the research proposal would evaluate a random sample set of 
buyer feedback comments independently and compare the results with those of the 
coders. This reliability method has been deemed as the most accurate by Kolbe and 
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Burnett (1991) and has been used for textual analysis in prior research studies. Next 
Cohen’s Kappa would be used to assess inter-coder reliability among the coders who 
were reviewing the buyer feedback comments for negative-positive type comments. In 
each case one person who was observing the situation (coding the negative-positive 
feedback comments among buyers) was an indicator. The Kappa would provide an 
estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’ observations or 
scores.  Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the proportion of 
agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, et al., 2007).  One Kappa would compare the 
negative-positive feedback between coder 1 and coder 2; one Kappa would compare 
coder 1 with coder 3; and one Kappa would compare coder 2 with coder 3.   For coder 
agreement, the majority ratings would be used (two out of three) to code Negative-
Positive Consensus as Y (Yes) or N (No). 
Population Size  
     In the initial plan, the population size needed to be estimated to determine the 
feasibility of the traditional methodology of using dedicated raters. Using a prototype of 
the proposed web crawler program, a full data extract from eBay was performed for the 
previously identified target - Computers and Networking: Laptop category. A full data 
extract included all sellers as it did not filter out sellers based on their feedback score. 
The full data extract procedure was repeated once a week for three weeks with the results 
summarized in figure 11. Where Total Auction Items was the number of individual items 
listed in the category for sale. Where Total Unique Sellers was the number of unique 
sellers (based on eBay userid) in the category. Elimination of duplicate sellers was a 
necessary step as a single seller can list several items for sale. Where Total Feedback 
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Comments was the composite of all feedback comments found in each unique seller’s 
eBay member profile. 
Week Total Auction Items Total Unique Sellers Total Feedback 
Comments 
1 15,823 438 361,040 
2 15,282 406 355,469 
3 16,431 446 365,056 
Figure 11.  Data Extracts for Category – Computers & Networking: PC Laptops & Notebooks 
 
     The findings of the three full data extractions showed a relatively small population of 
unique buyers ranging from 406 to 446. A small number of unique buyers could 
adversely effect the research’s data analysis as the number of fraudulent sellers within the 
eBay member population is reported to be very small.  Exactly how small the fraudulent 
seller population is could be seen by the 0.01 percent officially reported by eBay (B. Cox, 
2003; Konrad, 2005). Based on this rate and a unique seller population of 446, the 
number of fraudulent sellers would be estimated at 0.0446 which effectively was zero. 
The number only rose to 0.20 percent based on a research study of eBay fraud by Gregg 
and Scott (2008). Using this calculation and a unique seller population of 446, the 
number of fraudulent sellers would be estimated at 0.892 which rounded up to one. Per 
prior cited research studies, the distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed 
and focused on specific categories like the Computers and Networking: PC Laptops & 
Notebooks category. Even with the skewing effect should the number of eBay sellers 
designated by the evaluators as exhibiting fraudulent type behavior had proven 
insufficient, two options were available: 
1. Select another skewed category with a larger unique seller population. 
2. Combine multiple skewed categories to create a larger unique seller population. 
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Whether or not either of these options would need to be implemented could only be 
determined after the evaluators reviewed the unique sellers and determined the number of 
sellers exhibiting fraudulent type behavior in the Computers and Networking: PC 
Laptops and Notebooks category. Therefore the most prudent course of action was for 
evaluators to complete their review of the unique sellers before the coders began work on 
the buyer feedback comments. Two other conclusions were draw from the small number 
of unique sellers that were found: 
1. As the unique seller population needed to be maximized filtering the seller population 
size based on feedback score was not required. 
2. Sampling method and size for sellers was a moot point as finding a small number of 
unique sellers required inclusion of the entire population. 
     Using the data extraction from week 3, an analysis was performed on the buyer 
feedback comments population (see Figure 12). 
  Number Percent 
Total Feedback Comments 365,056  100.00% 
 Minus Negative 3,273 (0.90%) 
 Minus Neutral 3,030 (0.83%) 
 Minus Blank 2,167 (0.59%) 
Remaining Positive 356,586 97.68% 
 Minus As Buyer  13,224 (3.62%) 
 Minus Non-English 7,566 (2.00%) 
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments 335,796 92.00% 
Figure 12.  Analysis of Data Extract for Week 3 
 
The Total Feedback Comments found was 365,056. All unqualified records were deleted 
from the Total Feedback Comments population: 
Minus Negative – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Negative was removed 
as negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. 
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Minus Neutral – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Neutral was removed as 
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. 
Minus Blank – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of blank was removed as 
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. eBay will set a feedback 
type to blank for partially deleted or censured comments.  
The Remaining Positive number of 356,586 contained only feedback comments that had 
a feedback type of Positive.  
     Most eBay members switch between the roles of seller and buyer. Each qualified 
seller’s eBay member profile can contain feedback for both roles. Therefore all feedback 
comments in which the seller was acting as a buyer needed to be eliminated as designated 
by Minus As Buyer.  
     A data set member which is different in some way from the general pattern is called 
an outlier. An unexpected set of outliers were found during the analysis of the data 
extract. Although eBay has websites hosted in over 30 countries, the ebay.com website 
located in the United States is the largest and is used by eBay members living in other 
countries. As a result, some of the buyer feedback comments from the international eBay 
members were not in English. Non-English buyer feedback comments were found written 
in French, German, Italian, Spanish, and other languages. Inclusion of non-English buyer 
feedback comments would result in ambiguity due to translation plus the additional 
expense of hiring translators. The assumption was made that buyer feedback comments 
are consistent regardless of the language in which they are composed. That is to say a 
buyer’s compliment or complaint about a seller in the form of a feedback comment was 
independent of the spoken/written language used by the buyer. Therefore non-English 
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buyer feedback comments which constitute less than 2% of the total population were 
treated as outliers and excluded from the data to be analyzed.  This exclusion was 
indicated by Minus Non-English. 
     The analysis of the pilot data extract for week 3 provided quantitative measurements 
for the magnitude of the proposed analysis work. As designated by Total Unique Sellers - 
the total number of sellers that would need to be reviewed is 446. As designated by 
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments - the total number of buyer feedback comments that 
would need to be reviewed is 335,796. When the actual production data extraction was 
eventually performed for the dissertation report the resulting numbers did vary, but the 
magnitude remained the same. This consistent order of magnitude made it possible to 
estimate in advance the time and labor required (workload) to complete the analysis of 
sellers and buyer feedback comments. 
Analysis of the Seller Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters  
     The research study required analysis of two components – buyer feedback comments 
and sellers. As previously stated the interpretation of the natural language contained in 
the buyer feedback comments must be done by a human as automated options do not 
provide the required accuracy. The analysis of the sellers was complex requiring a 
judgment to determine whether each seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior or not.  
As previously stated this judgment must be done by a human as an automated option does 
not exist. 
     Having established that both components would require human analysis, a framework 
for performing each analysis was specified. The seller analysis framework was described 
in the prior section entitled Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or 
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Fraudulent. The mechanics to implement the framework are described in step-by-step 
detail for the evaluators per Appendix E – Coding: Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest 
or Fraudulent. The buyer feedback comment analysis framework was described in the 
prior section entitled Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-
Positive or Not. The mechanics to implement the framework are described in step-by-step 
detail for the coders per Appendix F – Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as 
Negative-Positive.  
     Using the data extraction from week 3 and following the section entitled Coding – 
Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent, a time-trial test was run using three 
individuals each assigned the role of evaluator.  The researcher preselected a sample of 
10 sellers to ensure that the evaluators experience the full range of seller behaviors. As 
the objective of the test was to determine the average time required to review a seller, 
inter-evaluator reliability was not measured.  The average time to evaluate a single seller 
was 20 minutes.  This was calculated based on elapsed time for each evaluator to 
complete the test divided by 10 sellers give the average time for the evaluator to review a 
single seller. The average time for each of the three evaluators was summed together and 
divided by three giving the overall average of 20 minutes. From this information, an 
estimated time to complete the analysis and the cost of the analysis was extrapolated 
using three dedicated raters as evaluators and a minimum wage rate of $8 per hour 
(Figure 13). 
 
446 Sellers X 0.33 Hours/Seller = 148 Hours [18.5 workdays] 
 
148 Hours X $8.00/Hour X 3 Evaluators = $3,552 
 
Figure 13.  Analysis of Sellers – Estimated Time and Cost 
 
62 
  
Analysis of the Feedback Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters  
     Using the data extraction from week 3 and following the section entitled Coding – 
Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive or Not, a time-trial test was 
run using three individuals each assigned the role of coder. The researcher preselected a 
sample of 100 buyer feedback comments to ensure that the coders experienced the full 
range of buyer feedback comments. As the objective of the test was to determine the 
average time required to review a single buyer feedback comment, inter-coder reliability 
was not measured. The average time to evaluate a single buyer feedback comment was 15 
seconds. This was calculated based on elapsed time for each coder to complete the test 
divided by 100 buyer feedback comments give the average time for the coder  to review a 
single buyer feedback comment. The average time for each of the three coders was 
summed together and divided by three giving the overall average of 15 seconds.  From 
this information, an estimated time to complete the analysis and the cost of the analysis 
was extrapolated using three dedicated raters as coders and a minimum wage rate of $8 
per hour (Figure 14). 
  
335,796 Buyer Feedback Comments X 15 Seconds/Buyer Feedback Comments 
X 1 Hour/3600 Seconds = 1400 Hours [175 workdays] 
 
1400 Hours X $8.00/Hour X 3 Evaluators  = $33,600 
 
Figure 14.  Analysis of Buyer Feedback Comments – Estimated Time and Cost  
 
Analysis Summary of the Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters  
     Three factors needed to be considered for the successful implementation and 
completion of the research study – feasibility, time, and resources. A major cause of 
failure was found in the lack of financial resources as the total estimated cost was 
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$37,152 (Seller $3,552 + Feedback $33,600). The next issue was time with a minimum 
requirement of 175 workdays for the coders to complete their work which was not 
satisfactory. Lastly, measuring inter-rater reliability requires that all three raters for each 
analysis complete all the work. Hiring a new rater would mean scrubbing any work 
completed by the old rater and redoing all the work. The probability of one of the raters 
quitting the project before completing all the work was high. Although manageable – 
hiring a new evaluator would result in an additional 18.5 workday delay. Having to hire a 
new coder would result in an additional 175 workday delay which would not be viable. 
Thus the feasibility of using dedicated full-time raters was low. 
     One alternative to reduce the cost for analysis would be to minimize the number of 
buyer feedback comments that are reviewed. Random sampling would normally be the 
method used to achieve this goal. In research question 3 (RQ3), it was stated - For each 
seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a pattern?  As 
the size of the buyer feedback comment population in negative-positive format was an 
unknown at the time, inclusion of all negative-positive feedback comments was a 
prerequisite to analyzing the presence or absence of any pattern. The conclusion drawn 
was that the population would need to be analyzed in toto.   In summary, the initial plan 
using the traditional method of dedicated raters was not viable and an alternative 
methodology for performing the two analyses was needed.  
Introduction to Amazon Mechanical    
     One of the components of the Amazon Web Services suite is Amazon Mechanical 
Turk ("Amazon Web Services," 2010).   Launched in 2005 as a commercial offering, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) was initially used by Amazon for internal projects 
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("Amazon Mechanical Turk," 2010). Its purpose was to fulfill the demand for using 
human intelligence rather than a computer to perform a task. This type of task was called 
a Human Intelligence Task (HIT). A HIT is defined as a problem that humans find 
simple, but computers are unable to do or find extremely difficult to do. For example a 
HIT related to a photograph could be - “What animal is in this photograph?” 
     AMT is a commercial implementation of crowdsourcing. The concept of 
crowdsourcing was first described in a Wired magazine article as outsourcing tasks to a 
large group of people (Howe, 2006). Unlike user-generated content or social networks, 
participants in a crowdsourcing have no contact with one another. One AMT worker 
cannot see the results of another’s work. A problem is broken down into discrete tasks. 
Each task is self-contained. As the tasks are self-contained, it is possible for each task to 
be assigned to a different individual (or multiple individuals) and worked on 
simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work force. The 
potential processing capacity of crowdsourcing architecture can be more fully appreciated 
based on an observation by von Ahn et al. (2004) where they calculated that a crowd of 
5,000 people playing an appropriately designed computer game 24 hours a day could 
label all 425,000,000 images on the Google website in just 31days.  
     Within AMT users can function in two roles - requester and worker. Requesters post 
work to be done using units called Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs (See Figure 15). 
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Figure 15.  Sample Human Intelligence Task (HIT) 
 
     Each HIT has a value in the form of a micro-payment which can be as little as $0.01. 
Every HIT can be completed by one or multiple workers before it is removed from the 
list of available HITs. The requester sets the number of workers based on assignments set 
per HIT. An assignment is the maximum number of workers who can perform the task. A 
HIT can optionally have one or more qualifications. A qualification can be a system 
qualification provided by AMT like Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. Another type of 
qualification is the user-defined qualification.  A user-defined qualification is a test built 
by a requester. For example requiring a worker to take a Spanish Comprehension Test 
and pass with a minimum grade before being allowed to work on HITs translating 
sentences from English to Spanish. A requester can specify a time limit within which 
workers must complete work on a HIT.  The requester pays the workers for completed 
HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without payment any HIT deemed invalid.  
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The requester can block workers based on their AMT userid from working on specific 
HITs. 
     A person who signs up to perform work on AMT is described as a worker. AMT 
workers commonly refer to themselves as “Turkers” in online discussion forums and 
blogs (Snow, O'Connor, Jurafsky, & Ng, 2008). Workers are only paid upon completion 
of work on a HIT and approval of the requester. Tasks are randomly assigned to a worker 
within a HIT.  Should a HIT have multiple assignments, a worker can only work on a 
given task within a HIT once. Before choosing to work on a HIT - a worker can see 
sample HITs, payment information, the time limit for working on a HIT, and any 
qualification requirements. Workers discover HITs based on a keyword search interface 
that provides HIT previews. It is the worker’s discretion to determine which HITs and the 
number of HITs that will be worked on. Payments for completed tasks can be redeemed 
by workers on Amazon via gift certificate or be later transferred to a worker's bank 
account. 
     A hypothetical example to illustrate the mechanics for AMT - Imagine you own a 
store that sells toys. Your store has a website on which customers can review your 
inventory of toys and make purchases.  The website displays your entire store inventory 
of 2,000 toys. A picture and description for each toy to be displayed on the website are 
stored in a database. You recently received complaints from multiple customers that 
some of the toys’ pictures and descriptions do not match on the website. 
     The problem is “Does the toy’s picture correctly match its description?” In order to 
solve this problem you would manually need to compare every toy’s picture against its 
description. This is a time consuming task and prone to error due to its repetitive nature.  
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     Alternatively you can use AMT. Acting as an AMT requester you need to create 2,000 
HITs – one HIT for each toy found in the database. It is not necessary to manually create 
each of the 2,000 HITs. Using a HIT template (see Figure 16) and importing the contents 
of the database, the 2,000 HITs can be automatically created. 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Sample HIT Template 
 
First you create the HIT template. Next using the newly created HIT template and 
importing the contents of the website database, the 2,000 HITs are automatically created. 
As requester you need to “Publish” the HITs to make them available to workers.  An 
example of the how a published HIT would look to a worker can be seen in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17.  Sample HIT for a Worker 
 
Almost immediately after being published the HITs will be discovered by workers in the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk’s List of Available HITs.  Multiple workers will 
simultaneously work on completing the HITs by clicking on the appropriate answer of 
YES or NO. As graphic image matching HITs are popular with workers, this number of 
HITs would typically be completed in less than an hour at a cost of $20 (2,000 HITS X 
$0.01/HIT). 
     AMT provides tools for a requester to monitor the HITs completion progress and 
review a worker’s answer for each HIT.  The requester pays the workers for completed 
HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without payment any HIT deemed invalid.  
The requester can block workers based on their AMT userid from working on specific 
HITs. The results are exported in the format of CSV data file. The results can then be 
analyzed to identify where a toy’s picture and description did not match (See Figure 18). 
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Figure 18.  Simplified and Annotated Example of HIT Results 
 
Building the Prototype HITs for Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     In order to estimate the time and labor required (workload) for using AMT, a 
prototype Seller HIT and prototype Buyer Feedback HIT was constructed.  
     Within the AMT both requesters and workers are anonymous with everyone provided 
a unique system generated userid and identifiable information redacted. The two obvious 
concerns in using AMT arise when asking unseen, remote, and random strangers to 
perform a task.  The first question was - How do you know that the workers will have the 
prerequisite skills or knowledge to perform correctly the task?  The second question was - 
How do you know that the workers will actually make an effort to perform the task rather 
than just randomly click on responses? 
     The question of a worker having prerequisite skills or knowledge was addressed 
through the use of qualifications ("Amazon mechanical turk requester best practices 
guide," 2010). A HIT can optionally have one or more qualifications. A qualification can 
be a system qualification provided by AMT like Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. Another 
type of qualification is the user-defined qualification.  A user-defined qualification is a 
test built by a requester. For example requiring a worker to take a Spanish 
Comprehension Test and pass with a minimum grade before being allowed to work on 
HITs translating sentences from English to Spanish. 
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     Two qualifications came directly from the sections entitled Coding – Identifying Seller 
Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent and Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment 
as Negative-Positive or Not.  The two qualifications were common for both prototype 
HITs – the worker must be 18 years or older AND the worker must be a native English 
speaker. AMT has a mandated age requirement of 18 year or older for any worker. The 
age qualification must be satisfied before AMT will issue an AMT userid to the worker. 
A user-defined qualification named Research Qualification Native English Speaker was 
created to qualify a worker as native English speaker (See Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19.  Research Qualification Native English Speaker 
 
The definition of “native speaker” was taken in the content of "mother tongue" which is 
the first language a person heard/spoke as a child ("Merriam-Webster's collegiate 
dictionary," 2005). For the Research Qualification Native English Speaker qualification – 
the required answers to qualify/pass as a “Native English Speaker” were YES for “I am a 
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native English speaker” and YES for the “First language I spoke as a child was English.” 
The other two questions were conspicuous distracters. 
     A third common qualification was based on a recommendation from the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk Best Practices Guide ("Amazon mechanical turk requester best 
practices guide," 2010). Per the guide, “To get the best selection of workers, we suggest 
using workers that have an approval rating of 95% or higher” which was designated by 
the system qualification named Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. This qualification was 
automatically managed by AMT and only needed to be included in the list of 
qualifications required for each of the prototype HITs. 
     For the prototype Seller HIT a user-defined qualification named Research 
Qualification Seller Test was created to test the worker’s skills at performing the task of 
evaluating sellers for exhibiting fraudulent type behavior.  The user-defined qualification 
was composed of a tutorial and a single seller which needed to be evaluated by the 
worker. Due to the extended time required by a worker to review a seller only a single 
seller was used in the qualification test. The qualification test was composed of 26 
questions which were asked to assist and guide the worker in gathering the necessary data 
to base their final judgment.  The 27th question was the final judgment question – “Did 
the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” and asked for a NO or YES 
answer. As the qualification test seller clearly was exhibiting fraudulent type behavior, 
the answer required to qualify/pass the Research Qualification Seller Test was answering 
YES to the objective judgment question of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type 
behavior to buyers?” The Research Qualification Seller Test was set to manual which 
required the researcher to individually review and authorize each worker as qualified.  
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The manual option allowed the researcher to verify that the applicant worker actually 
completed the 27 questions for the qualification test and was not gaming by just 
randomly answering YES on the 27th question. The Research Qualification Seller Test 
can be found in Appendix G - Research Qualification Seller Test.  
     Passing of the qualifiers – Research Qualification Native English Speaker and 
Research Qualification Seller Test – permitted a worker to gain access to the prototype 
Seller HIT named Research Prototype Seller. For a test population - the researcher reused 
the same preselected sample of 10 sellers from the previously run evaluator time-trial 
test. Each of the Research Prototype Seller HITs was based on the same format as the 
Research Qualification Seller Test. It was composed of a single seller which needed to be 
evaluated by the worker. Twenty-six questions were asked to assist and guide the worker 
in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment.  The 27th question was the 
final judgment question – “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” and 
asked for a NO or YES answer. The last entry in the HIT form was an optional comment 
field to provide a means for feedback from workers. The Research Prototype Seller HIT 
was can be found in Appendix H - Research Prototype Seller HIT.  
     For the prototype Buyer Feedback Comment HIT a user-defined qualification named 
Research Qualification Feedback Test was created to test the worker’s skills at 
performing the task of evaluating buyer feedback comments. The researcher preselected 
an additional sample of 50 buyer feedback comments to ensure that the AMT workers 
would experienced the full range of buyer feedback comments. The user-defined 
qualification was composed of a tutorial and 50 questions. Each question contained one 
buyer feedback comment which needed to be evaluated by the worker. For each question 
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a single buyer feedback comment was displayed, the question was asked “Is the 
following statement in negative-positive format?” and asked for a NO or YES answer. 
The worker’s responses were compared to the correct answers for each question. A grade 
of 90% or higher was required to qualify/pass the Research Qualification Feedback Test. 
The Research Qualification Feedback Test can be found in Appendix I - Research 
Qualification Feedback Test.  
     Passing of the qualifiers – Research Qualification Native English Speaker and 
Research Qualification Feedback Test – permitted a worker to gain access to the 
prototype Buyer Feedback HIT named Research Prototype Feedback. For a test 
population - the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 100 buyer feedback 
comments from the previously run coder time-trial test. Each of the Research Prototype 
Feedback HITs was similar in format to the Research Qualification Feedback Test but 
only contained instructions/tutorial and a single question. In order to reduce scrolling 
time, the instructions/tutorial were hidden by default, but could be toggled (display/hide) 
by clicking on the hyperlink. One buyer feedback comment was displayed, the question 
was asked “Is the following statement in negative-positive format?”, and the worker was 
asked for a NO or YES answer. The last entry in the HIT was an optional comment field 
which provided a means for feedback from workers. The Research Prototype Feedback 
HIT with the instructions hidden can be seen in Appendix J - Research Prototype 
Feedback HIT with Instructions Hidden. An example with the instructions displayed can 
be seen in Appendix K - Research Prototype Feedback HIT with Instructions Displayed. 
     The second issue was whether or not the AMT workers would do the HITs correctly. 
Even after qualifying/passing the pre-HIT qualifications, a worker could still give random 
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answers for a HIT. A perceived lack of accountability could motivate some AMT 
workers to complete as many tasks as possible by just arbitrarily clicking. A classic 
example of rational self interest where an individual attempts to maximize their 
[monetary] rewards while minimizing their effort and costs. This type of activity by AMT 
workers is known by the slang term of “gaming” (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor, 
2010). In one of more recent developments, gaming has been taken to the next level by 
the use of autonomous software applications known as “bots” to simulate human activity 
(Dekel & Shamir, 2009).  
     AMT requires the requester to approve each HIT done by a worker.  The requester 
pays the workers for completed HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without 
payment any HIT deemed invalid.  The requester can block workers based on their AMT 
userid from working on specific HITs. As the requester is the ultimate authority on the 
disposition of any HIT, the question raised by the second issue was - What techniques 
can a requester employ to ensure or measure the quality of a HIT? 
     Multiple techniques were applied to ensure or measure the quality of the data provided 
by AMT workers. These selected techniques have been employed by prior researchers 
when they used AMT - multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum work 
time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing.   
     Plurality (Multiple work assignments per HIT) is one of the three mechanisms built 
into AMT to help ensure quality. Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an 
aggregate of four to six workers matched the results of a single domain expert.  The use 
of plurality has been tested and verified by Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchak et al. 
(2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008). When a simple majority of the workers 
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agree on the result, the result will be accepted as the “correct” answer. If no plurality 
emerges, this usually means that the HIT is ambiguous (Barr & Cabrera, 2006). 
     AMT automatically measures and records the elapsed time required for a work to 
complete a HIT.  A requester has the ability to generate an ad hoc report while a HIT 
batch is being processed to list all HITs completed below a specified minimum work 
time. Extremely short HIT durations by a worker - especially if found for multiple HITs - 
is an indicator of suspect work (Kittur, Chi, & Suh, 2008). 
     Both the qualification HITs and the tutorial/instructions included in each data HIT 
clearly indicated that all workers would be audited. Signaling to potential workers that 
their answers would be critically analyzed for invalid or random responses has been 
proven to increase the quality and time spent on the HITs (Kittur, et al., 2008). 
     Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of 
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are 
trusted and a domain expert. Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the 
answers provided by the AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly 
deviates from the gold standard, then there is a high degree of probability that the worker 
is poorly performing, not doing what was asked or is attempting to game the system. This 
technique has been used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth (2008), and 
Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010). The mechanics for the technique was randomly 
inserting (also known as salting) gold standard data into HITs. A worker did not know if 
the data to be evaluated came from the new data or from the gold standard. Details on 
construct of the gold standard data sets can be found in the sections - Creating Gold 
Standard Sellers and Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks. 
76 
  
Analysis of the Seller Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     A pilot run was done using the AMT Research Prototype Seller HIT. Parameters were 
set to match those of the previously completed time-trial run using traditional dedicated 
raters (evaluators). The HIT assignment was set to three to allow three workers to serve 
in the role of evaluator for each Research Prototype Seller HIT.  For a test population - 
the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 10 sellers from the previously run 
evaluator time-trial test. AMT automatically calculated the average time for a worker to 
evaluate a single seller at 22 minutes.  
     Using AMT requires that all HITs be self-contained. The self-containment makes it 
possible for each HIT to be assigned to a different worker (or multiple workers) and 
processed simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work 
force. The variability of the massive parallel architecture makes it difficult to calculate 
quantitatively the total time required to review all the feedbacks. Based on empirical 
evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required to process all the 
sellers would range from a few hours to a few days (Heilman & Smith, 2010; Su, Pavlov, 
Chow, & Baker, 2007).  As AMT workers are paid piece-work per HIT, there was no cost 
for the time spent by workers. 
     The pilot run for the Research Prototype Seller HIT mimicked the time-trial test in 
having three evaluators (workers) reviewing each seller. The idea being that simple 
majority rule would be used to formulate the “final” answer for any question. Snow et al. 
(2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six workers matched the 
results of a single domain expert.  A majority of five workers was cited by Yan et al. 
(2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% accuracy. Heilman 
77 
  
and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008) also 
determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. Based on this evidence 
the number of workers assigned to a production Seller HIT was increased from three to 
five for the production runs. 
     Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five 
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review 
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an 
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts, 
2009).  The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted 
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more 
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s 
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a 
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches 
in the event of low worker response. 
     The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Especially as the only data to 
be collected was the final judgment answer of YES or NO contained in the 27th question 
of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” The answers for the other 
26 questions were not collected or analyzed as their sole purpose was to assist and guide 
the worker in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment. The population of 
production Seller HITs was salted with 10% Gold Standard Sellers. The 10% gold 
standard measure was within the suggested 5% to10% range ("Crowdflower - gold 
standard," 2010). 
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     From the prototype test information, an estimated cost of the analysis was extrapolated 
using the proposed five evaluators (Figure 20). 
 
446 Sellers X 1.10 Gold Standard Multiplier1 X 1 HIT/Seller 
X $0.25/HIT X 5 Evaluators = $614 
 
Note: 1 of every 10 Seller HITs will be a Gold Standard Seller. 
 
Figure 20.  Analysis of Sellers – Estimated Cost using AMT 
 
Analysis of the Feedback Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     A pilot run was done using the AMT Research Prototype Feedback HIT. Parameters 
were set to match those of the previously completed time-trial run using traditional 
dedicated raters (coders). The HIT assignment was set to three to allow three workers to 
serve in the role of coder for each Research Prototype Feedback HIT.  For a test 
population - the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 100 feedbacks from the 
previously run coder time-trial test. AMT automatically calculated the average time for a 
worker to evaluate a single buyer feedback comment at 17 seconds.  
     Using AMT requires that all HITs be self-contained. The self-containment makes it 
possible for each HIT to be assigned to a different worker (or multiple workers) and 
processed simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work 
force. The variability of the massive parallel architecture makes it difficult to calculate 
quantitatively the total time required to review all the feedbacks. Based on empirical 
evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required to process all the 
buyer feedback comments would range from a few hours to a few days (Heilman & 
Smith, 2010; Su, et al., 2007).  As AMT workers are paid piece-work (per HIT), there 
was no cost for the time spent by workers. 
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     The pilot run for the Research Prototype Feedback HIT mimicked the time-trial test in 
having three coders (workers) reviewing each feedback. The idea being that simple 
majority rule would be used to formulate the “final” answer for any question. Snow et al. 
(2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six workers matched the 
results of a single domain expert.  A majority of five workers was cited by Yan et al. 
(2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% accuracy. Heilman 
and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008) also 
determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. Based on this evidence 
the number of workers assigned to a production Seller HIT was increased from three to 
five for the production runs. 
     Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five 
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review 
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an 
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts, 
2009).  The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted 
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more 
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s 
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a 
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches 
in the event of low worker response.  
     The number of questions (buyer feedback comments to be reviewed) in the production 
feedback HIT was raised from one as seen in the prototype Feedback HIT to ten. There 
were two compelling reasons to do this. The first was the need to cut costs as paying even 
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at the lowest possible rate of $0.01 when multiplied by hundreds of thousands of HITs 
results in a total cost of thousands of dollars. As the time and effort required answering a 
single question was minimal, pooling multiple questions together into a single HIT was a 
viable and common practice used by requestors (Feng, Besana, & Zajac, 2009; Finin, 
Murnane, Karandikar, Keller, & Martineau, 2010). Second, the quality of the workers’ 
data was a critical concern. Multiple questions per HIT made it possible to salt each HIT 
with one or more Gold Standard Feedbacks (Finin, et al., 2010). Each production 
Feedback HIT was salted with one Gold Standard Feedback which resulted in a gold 
standard measure of 10%. The 10% gold standard measure was within the suggested 5% 
to 10% range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). 
     From the prototype test information, an estimated cost of the analysis was extrapolated 
using the proposed five coders (Figure 21). 
 
335,796 Buyer Feedback Comments X 1.10 Gold Standard Multiplier1 
X 0.10 HITs2/Buyer Feedback Comment X $0.01/HITs X 5 Coders =  $1847 
 
Note 1: 1 of the 10 feedback comments per HIT will be a gold standard question. 
Note 2: 10 feedbacks/HIT is equal to 0.10 HIT/feedback. 
 
Figure 21.  Analysis of Buyer Feedback Comments – Estimated Cost Using AMT 
 
Analysis Summary for the Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     Three factors needed to be considered for the successful implementation and 
completion of the research study – feasibility, time, and resources. The required financial 
resources were viable as sufficient research funding was available to cover the total 
estimated cost of $2,461 (Seller $614 + Feedback $1,847). The next the issue was time – 
Based on empirical evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required 
to process all the seller and buyer feedback comments would range from a few hours to a 
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few days (Heilman & Smith, 2010; Su, et al., 2007). As AMT workers are paid piece-
work per HIT, there was no cost for the time spent by workers. Since the maximum time 
required to process all the data was estimated at a few days, should it have proven 
necessary the process could have been repeated multiple times in the event of an 
unexpected glitch occurring or to process additional data that was collected. The only 
constraint would be securing additional funding. The feasibility of using AMT was 
proven based on the successful pilot runs of the prototype Seller HIT and the prototype 
Feedback HIT. As with prior researchers that have used AMT, the major concern was 
applying the appropriate techniques to ensure that quality data would be produced by the 
workers. For integrity, a new group of people served as raters in creating the gold 
standard data for the study. Selection and qualification of new raters followed the 
procedure previously defined in the sections - Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as 
Honest or Fraudulent and Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-
Positive or Not. In summary, the proposed alternative of using AMT to process the 
experimental data was a viable solution. 
Creating Gold Standard Sellers  
     Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the answers provided by the 
AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly deviated from the gold 
standard, then there was a high degree of probability that the worker was poorly 
performing, not doing what was asked or was attempting to game the system.  
     A quality control technique used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth 
(2008), and Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010) was randomly inserting (also known as 
salting) gold standard data into HITs to identify poorly performing, malicious or gaming 
82 
  
workers. A worker did not know if the data to be evaluated came from the new data or 
from the gold standard. Workers that gave too many wrong answers to the gold standard 
were more likely to add noise to the overall results and needed to be filtered out. Noise is 
defined as the measure of deviation from the gold standard data (Hsueh, Melville, & 
Sindhwani, 2009).   
     Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of 
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are 
trusted and a domain expert. Snow et al. (2008) demonstrated using multiple non-experts 
averaged out the noise resulting in the same quality answer as an expert. This technique 
was then applied by Snow et al. (2008) to produce gold standard data used in training sets 
as no gold standard data existed. Similarly research by Callison-Burch (2009) on machine 
translation quality and by Nowak and Ruger (2010) on tagging of images supported the 
findings that when combined non-expert judgments were equal to or better than human 
experts. As no gold standard data set existed for determining whether or not an eBay 
seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior, the technique of using multiple non-experts 
was used to create a Gold Standard Sellers. 
     A gold standard with noise would only support cautious benchmarking as it requires 
performance of the workers be better than the baseline by more than that which can be 
attributed to the noise. As noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold 
standard data (Hsueh, et al., 2009), noise level is reduced as the inter-rater agreement for 
an answer is increased. Noise is totally eliminated when all the raters are in agreement for 
an answer. In order to produce gold standard data with no noise, only answers with a 
strict metric were included. Strict metric is defined as the raters having consensus for an 
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answer (Ku, Lo, & Chen, 2007). The use of strict metric (consensus) negated the need to 
measure inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa. 
     When the production data extract was completed, a seller was randomly selected from 
the extracted population.  The randomly selected seller was reviewed by five qualified 
and dedicated evaluators. The number of evaluators selected was based on the 
recommendations of Snow et al. (2008), Callison-Burch (2009), and Klebanov and 
Beigman (2009). The same five evaluators were used to review all the sellers. The 
evaluation process followed the procedure as specified in the section entitled Coding – 
Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent. A seller was only added to the Gold 
Standard Sellers if all the evaluators had a consensus in their answer. Any seller that did 
not have evaluator consensus was discarded. The suggested quantity of gold standard 
data is from 5% to 10% of the total population ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010).  
Based on the unique seller population size of 502 (See Chapter 4 for details), the size of 
the Gold Standard Seller data set could range from 25 to 50. Sellers continued to be 
randomly selected by the researcher and evaluated by the evaluators until the Gold 
Standard Seller data set was populated with the minimum number of 25 required 
candidates. All sellers were unique within the Gold Standard Seller data set – no 
duplicates. 
Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks  
     Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the answers provided by the 
AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly deviated from the gold 
standard, then there was a high degree of probability that the worker was poorly 
performing, not doing what was asked or was attempting to game the system.  
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     A quality control technique used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth 
(2008), Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010), and other researchers was randomly inserting 
(also known as salting) gold standard data into HITs to identify poorly performing, 
malicious or gaming workers. A worker did not know if the data to be evaluated came 
from the new data or from the gold standard. Workers that gave too many wrong answers 
to the gold standard were more likely to add noise to the overall results and needed to be 
filtered out. Noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold standard data 
(Hsueh, et al., 2009).  
     Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of 
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are 
trusted and a domain expert. Snow et al. (2008) demonstrated using multiple non-experts 
averaged out the noise resulting in the same quality answer as an expert. This technique 
was then applied by Snow et al. (2008) to produce gold standard data used in training sets 
as no gold standard data existed. Similarly research by Callison-Burch (2009) on machine 
translation quality and by Nowak and Ruger (2010) on tagging of images supported the 
findings that when combined non-expert judgments were equal to or better than human 
experts. As no gold standard data set existed for determining whether or not an eBay 
buyer feedback comment is in negative-positive format or not, the technique of using 
multiple non-experts was used to create a Gold Standard Feedbacks. 
     A gold standard with noise would only support cautious benchmarking as it requires 
performance of the workers be better than the baseline by more than that which can be 
attributed to the noise. As noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold 
standard data (Hsueh, et al., 2009), noise level is reduced as the inter-rater agreement for 
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an answer is increased. Noise is totally eliminated when all the raters are in agreement for 
an answer. In order to produce gold standard data with no noise, only answers with a 
strict metric were included. Strict metric is defined as the raters having consensus for an 
answer (Ku, et al., 2007).  The use of strict metric (consensus) negated the need to 
measure inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa. 
     After the production data was extracted, it was filtered leaving only qualified data 
which was 382,768 buyer feedback comments (see Chapter 4 for details). An eBay buyer 
feedback comment was randomly selected from the filtered population.  The randomly 
selected feedback comment was reviewed by five qualified and dedicated coders. The 
number of coders selected was based on the recommendations of Snow et al. (2008), 
Callison-Burch (2009), and Klebanov and Beigman (2009).  The same five coders were 
used to review all the feedback comments. The evaluation process followed the 
procedure as specified in the section entitled Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback 
Comment as Negative-Positive or Not. A feedback comment was only added to the Gold 
Standard Feedbacks if all the coders had a consensus in their answer. The same five 
coders were used to review all the feedback comments. Any feedback comment that did 
not have coder consensus was discarded. The population of feedback comments to be 
evaluated was 382,768 (see Chapter 4 for details). Because of the immense amount of 
data to be processed, it was broken down into 50 batches (See section Implementation of 
Production Feedback HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk). The calculated size of a batch 
was about 7,700 feedback comments. The suggested quantity of gold standard data is 
from 5% to 10% of the population ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). Multiplying 
5% times the 7,700 batch size yielded a result of 385. The size of the Gold Standard 
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Feedbacks data set could range from 385 to 770. Feedback comments continued to be 
randomly selected by the researcher and evaluated by the coders until the Gold Standard 
Feedbacks data set was populated with the minimum number of 385 required candidates. 
All feedback comments were unique within the Gold Standard Feedbacks data set – no 
duplicates. 
Implementation of Production Seller HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     A production Seller HIT was created and named Research Production Seller.  No 
changes were made to the production Seller HIT, therefore it had exactly the same format 
as the prototype Seller HIT (See Appendix H - Research Prototype Seller HIT). The 
production Seller HIT was used by AMT workers to answer YES or NO to the judgment 
question – “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” As in the pilot test, 
the following qualifications were placed on the production Seller HIT - Worker HIT 
Acceptance Rate, Research Qualification Native English Speaker, and Research 
Qualification Seller Test. Workers were only given permission to gain access to the 
production Seller HITs after qualifying/passing all the qualifications.  
     Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six 
workers matched the results of a single domain expert.  A majority of five workers was 
cited by Yan et al. (2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% 
accuracy. Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-
Molina (2008) also determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. 
 Based on this evidence the number of workers assigned to the production Seller HIT was 
set to five. 
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     The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Especially as the only data to 
be collected was the final judgment answer of YES or NO contained in the 27th question 
of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” The answers for the other 
26 questions was not collected or analyzed as their sole purpose was to assist and guide 
the worker in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment. The population of 
production Seller HITs was salted with 5% Gold Standard Sellers which were generated 
in a prior section entitled Creating Gold Standard Sellers. The 5% gold standard measure 
was within the suggested 5% to10% range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). 
     Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five 
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review 
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an 
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts, 
2009).  The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted 
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more 
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s 
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a 
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches 
in the event of low worker response.   
     The total seller population of 502 was broken up into 10 batches for processing on 
AMT. This was done for three reasons. First, per the “best strategy for a requester” 
multiple batches provided a mechanism to adjust micro-payments (if necessary) while 
completing the data processing at the lowest possible cost. Second, small batches made it 
easier to monitor and block any mass attempt at gaming by comparing worker answers to 
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the Gold Standard Sellers. Third, it provided time to review the HIT’s comment field for 
feedback from workers. Small batches made it possible to incorporate valid suggestions 
or make corrections without having to reprocess all the seller data. No suggestions were 
incorporated and no corrections were required for the production run. The comment field 
at the bottom of the HIT allowing for worker feedback replicated the technique used by 
Kosara and Ziemkiewicz (2010), Nowak and Ruger (2010), and Sorokin and Forsyth 
(2008). 
Implementation of Production Feedback HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk  
     A production Feedback HIT was created and named Research Production Feedback 
(See Appendix L – Research Production Feedback HIT). The number of questions (buyer 
feedback comments to be reviewed) in the production Feedback HIT was raised to ten 
compared to the one as seen in the prototype Feedback HIT. There were two compelling 
reasons to do this. The first was the need to cut costs as paying even at the lowest 
possible rate of $0.01 when multiplied by hundreds of thousands of HITs results in tens 
thousands of dollars for a total cost. As the time and effort required answering a single 
question was minimal, pooling multiple questions together into a single HIT was a viable 
and common practice used by requestors (Feng, et al., 2009; Finin, et al., 2010; Wenzel, 
2008). Second, the quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Multiple questions 
per HIT made it possible to salt each HIT with one or more Gold Standard Feedbacks 
(Finin, et al., 2010).  
     As in the pilot test, the following qualifications were placed on the production 
Feedback HIT - Worker HIT Acceptance Rate, Research Qualification Native English 
Speaker, and Research Qualification Feedback Test. Workers were only given 
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permission to gain access to the production Feedback HITs after qualifying/passing all 
the qualifications.  
     Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six 
workers matched the results of a single domain expert.  A majority of five workers was 
cited by Yan et al. (2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% 
accuracy. Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-
Molina (2008) also determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. 
Based on this evidence the number of workers assigned to the production Feedback HIT 
was set to five. 
     The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Each production Feedback 
HIT was salted with one Gold Standard Feedback which resulted in a gold standard 
measure of 10%. The 10% gold standard measure was within the suggested 5% to10% 
range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). The Gold Standard Feedbacks were 
generated in a prior section entitled Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks.  
     Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five 
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review 
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an 
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts, 
2009).  The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted 
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more 
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s 
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a 
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low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches 
in the event of low worker response.   
     The total feedback population of 382,768 was broken up into 50 batches for 
processing on AMT. This was done for four reasons. First, the massive size of the total 
feedback population was easier to handle when broken down into small batches. Second, 
per the “best strategy for a requester” multiple batches provided a mechanism to adjust 
micro-payments (if necessary) while completing the data processing at the lowest 
possible cost. Third, small batches made it easier to monitor and block any attempt at 
gaming by comparing worker answers to the Gold Standard Feedbacks. Fourth, it 
provided time to review the Production Feedback HIT’s comment field for feedback 
from workers. Small batches made it possible to incorporate valid suggestions or make 
corrections without having to reprocess all the buyer feedback comment data. No 
suggestions were incorporated and no corrections were required for the production run. 
The comment field at the bottom of the HIT allowing for worker feedback replicated the 
technique used by Kosara and Ziemkiewicz (2010), Nowak and Ruger (2010), and 
Sorokin and Forsyth (2008). 
Data Analysis 
     Data was entered into IBM SPSS Statistics 18 for Windows software application for 
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the sample and included frequency 
and percentages for nominal and categorical data.  Means and standard deviations were 
applied to interval or ratio data. Per Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) the following 
standards were used - for categorical data a 5% margin of error is acceptable;  for 
continuous data a 3% margin of error is acceptable; for a dichotomous variable like 
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Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus a 5% margin of error is acceptable; and a 95% 
confidence level with p = 0.5 is acceptable for most basic research studies. For a 
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) 
variable, a 5% margin of error is acceptable (Bartlett, et al., 2001). A 95% confidence 
level and p = 0.5 were assumed for the research study as this is acceptable for most basic 
research studies (Bartlett, et al., 2001). 
     For each research question, a null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are stated. 
Details are provided indicating the variables that would be used and statistical 
calculations that would be performed. Based on the principle of falsifiability (Gavin, 
2008), statistical calculations were performed to test the null hypothesis for rejection.  If 
the null hypothesis was rejected, then the alternative hypothesis would be examined to 
determine if that could be accepted. The result for each of the research questions is 
detailed in Chapter 4. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’ 
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type 
feedback comments from buyers predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent 
behavior.   For this analysis, the independent (predictor) variable was Negative-Positive 
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Consensus field and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller 
behavior was represented by the Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus field.  
     Logistic regression (also known as the logistic model or logit model) was the 
appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research question is to examine how an 
independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive dichotomous (divided or dividing into 
two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) criterion variable. 
     The Chi-square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association 
between the independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) and the dependent 
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus).  
Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict 
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does 
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments 
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not the number of negative-
positive type feedback comments predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent 
behavior. Logistic regression was the appropriate way to analyze the data as research 
question 2 was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive 
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) 
criterion variable. In this case, the independent variable was obtained by counting the 
number of negative-positive comments to achieve a continuous value. The dependent or 
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criterion variable was consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior which was 
dichotomized (1 = Y, 0 = N).  
Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a 
cluster?  
Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not 
fall into a cluster.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall 
into a cluster.  
     For the testing of whether or not negative-positive type feedback comments fell into a 
cluster, a Chi-square test of Independence was used. A cluster was determined when 
negative-positive type comments were found grouped around traditional comments in the 
sellers’ feedback transaction history. For example, when negative-positive type 
comments were separated by two traditional comments, and then followed by another 
occurrence of a negative-positive comment, a cluster was identified. In a cluster, the 
negative-positive type comments could be separated by as many as two traditional 
comments. For this analysis, the feedback either fell into the cluster (Yes) or not (No).  
 Summary 
     The objective of the research study was to determine if the presence of negative-
positive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving 
fraudulently. The correlational research design provided for discovering relationships 
between variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the 
discovered relationships predictions could be made. The correlational research design 
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(see Appendix A) was implemented using an automated data collection agent in order to 
efficiently sift through the massive quantities of data on eBay and locate the qualified 
sellers. The methodology was constructed with the goal of reducing the subjectivity and 
increasing the reliability of categorizing seller behavior as honest or fraudulent and buyer 
feedback comments as negative-positive or not. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Results 
 
 
Introduction 
     This chapter provides a presentation of the research findings and analysis of the data 
that was collected. It includes a review of the objective of the research study; the data 
collection procedure; the three research questions (with null and alternative hypothesis 
for each); data analysis for the research questions; and a summary of results. 
Objective of the Study 
     In a forensic case study of an opportunistic seller by Nikitov and Stone (2006), it was 
found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in positive feedback as a means 
of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their reputation. This category of 
positive feedback is described as “negative-positive” feedback. An example of negative-
positive feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping.”  The objective of this study was 
investigating the concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature to identify 
potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population.  
Data Collection 
     The issue of obtaining a sufficient population of sellers that exhibited fraudulent type 
behavior was previously discussed in the section entitled Population Size in Chapter 3 
Methodology. Each of the three full data extractions from the pilot study found relatively 
small populations of unique buyers - 406, 438, and 446 (see Figure 11). A small number 
of unique buyers could adversely effect the research’s data analysis as the number of 
fraudulent sellers within the eBay member population is reported to be very small. Per 
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prior cited research studies, the distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed 
and focused on specific categories.  Based on this information, the category of Computers 
and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks was selected for its potential in containing 
multiple fraudulent sellers. 
     The web crawler (see Appendix B) used was custom designed for the eBay website to 
retrieve the raw data.  The web crawler retrieved web pages, parsed the webpages to find 
the required data, determined if the found data met the selection criteria, and stored the 
qualified data for later analysis in a Comma Separated Variables (CSV) ASCII file as 
specified in Appendix C. The search space used by the web crawler was bounded by all 
sellers in the category of Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks. The 
result of the production full data extraction was a data set composed of 467,071 buyer 
feedback comments created by 502 unique eBay sellers. 
     The evaluators reviewed the unique eBay sellers and identified based on majority rule 
(3 of 5) the sellers exhibiting fraudulent behavior in the Computers and Networking: PC 
Laptops and Notebooks category.  Out of a total of 502 unique eBay userids, the number 
of sellers identified as exhibiting fraudulent behavior was 19.  This translated to 3.78% 
(19/502) of the total sellers were exhibiting fraudulent behavior. This number was 
sufficiently large enough to eliminate the need to rerun the web crawler using a new 
category or multiple categories in order to locate more eBay sellers exhibiting fraudulent 
type behavior. 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Collected Data 
     A summary of the collected data from the web crawler run can be seen in Figure 22. 
  Number Percent 
Total Feedback Comments 467,071 100.00% 
 Minus Negative 2,422 (0.52%) 
 Minus Neutral 2,757 (0.59%) 
 Minus Blank 1,048 (0.22%) 
Remaining Positive 460,844 98.67% 
 Minus As Buyer  74,865 (16.03%) 
 Minus Non-English 3,211 (0.69%) 
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments 382,768 81.95% 
Figure 22.  Analysis of Extracted Production Data 
 
The Total Feedback Comments found was 467,071. All unqualified records were deleted 
from the Total Feedback Comments population by the researcher: 
Minus Negative – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Negative was removed 
as negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. 
Minus Neutral – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Neutral was removed as 
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. 
Minus Blank – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of blank was removed as 
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. eBay will set a feedback 
type to blank for partially deleted or censured comments.  
The Remaining Positive number of 460,844 contained only feedback comments that had 
a feedback type of Positive.  
     Most eBay members switch between the roles of seller and buyer. Each qualified 
seller’s eBay member profile can contain feedback for both roles. Therefore all feedback 
comments in which the seller was acting as a buyer were eliminated by the researcher as 
designated by Minus As Buyer.  
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     Inclusion of non-English buyer feedback comments could result in ambiguity due to 
translation plus the additional expense of hiring translators. The assumption was made 
that buyer feedback comments are consistent regardless of the language in which they 
are composed. That is to say a buyer’s compliment or complaint about a seller in the 
form of a feedback comment is independent of the spoken/written language used by the 
buyer. Therefore non-English buyer feedback comments which constitute less than 1% of 
the total population were treated as outliers and excluded from the data to be analyzed.  
This exclusion made by the researcher was indicated by Minus Non-English. 
     As designated by Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments - the total number of buyer 
feedback comments that needed to be reviewed by the coders was 382,768. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk Processing – Sellers 
     From the total population of the 502 unique eBay sellers, one seller at a time was 
randomly pulled and evaluated by dedicated raters (evaluators) until 25 sellers were 
found having consensus of all evaluators (5 of 5). The seller was then added to the Gold 
Standard Sellers data set. As a matter of record, all the Gold Standard Sellers were 
classified as honest. This left 477 eBay sellers which needed to be processed. For quality 
control purposes, the 25 Gold Standard Sellers were added back into pool – resulting in 
502 unique eBay sellers to be reviewed by Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) evaluators. 
The sellers were randomly divided among the ten batches for processing on AMT. 
     A total of 19 sellers were designated by the AMT evaluators as fraudulently behaving 
sellers based on majority rule (3 of 5). An additional 18 sellers were tagged by AMT 
evaluators as potentially fraudulent sellers, but each of these sellers only received one or 
two votes which were insufficient to make a majority and be classified as fraudulent 
99 
  
sellers. Time for processing was approximately two days. The micro-payment was $0.30 
per Human Intelligence Test (HIT) with five assignments. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk Processing – Buyer Feedback Comments 
     As designated by Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments (see Figure 22) - the total 
number of buyer feedback comments that needed to be reviewed by the coders was 
382,768. As 50 batches would be used, the estimated size per batch was 7,700. The gold 
standard was set to 5% of the batch size which was 385 feedback comments (7,700 X 
0.05). Feedback comments were randomly pulled and evaluated by dedicated raters 
(coders) until 385 feedback comments were found having consensus of all coders (5 of 
5). The feedback comment was then added to the Gold Standard Feedbacks data set. This 
left 382,383 buyer feedback comments remaining to be evaluated (382,768 – 385).  
     The remaining feedback comments were randomly divided among 50 batches for 
processing on AMT. Each HIT was composed of ten feedback comments. Nine feedback 
comments for the HIT came from the batch. For quality control purposes, the tenth 
feedback comment in each HIT was randomly salted with one of the 385 Gold Standard 
Feedbacks. Repetitive use of Gold Standard Feedbacks in the batches was not an issue as 
many feedback comments like “Good seller!” were commonly used by multiple buyers. 
     Out of 382,768 feedback comments, 2,247 were identified by coders as negative-
positive feedback comments based on majority rule (3 of 5). Thus negative-positive 
feedback comments constituted only 0.59% of the total qualified positive buyer feedback 
comments (2,247/382,768). Time for processing was approximately five days. The 
micro-payment was $0.01 per HIT with five assignments. 
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Amazon Mechanical Turk – Quality Control 
     The techniques of qualification tests, multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), 
minimum work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing were used to 
ensure the reliability of raters.  The Research Qualification Seller Test was set to manual 
which required the researcher to individually review and authorize each worker as 
qualified. Seven AMT workers were rejected for the Research Qualification Seller Test.  
No seller production HITs were rejected. For the feedback production HITS, the work (in 
entirety) done by three AMT workers was rejected. One AMT worker was obvious 
gaming as only N (No) was entered as an answer to every question. The other two AMT 
workers failed to correctly answer multiple Gold Standard Feedbacks, it was concluded 
that they were either gaming by randomly answering or had poor performance. When 
HITs were rejected and released for processing by other workers, a reject message was 
sent to the effected AMT worker explaining that the required level of quality was not 
met. The rejected AMT worker was then blocked from working on any more HITs. 
Analysis Delimitations  
     Data was entered into IBM SPSS Statistics 18 for Windows software application for 
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the sample and included frequency 
and percentages for nominal and categorical data.  Means and standard deviations were 
applied to interval or ratio data. Per Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001) the following 
standards were used - for categorical data a 5% margin of error is acceptable;  for 
continuous data a 3% margin of error is acceptable; for a dichotomous variable like 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus a 5% margin of error is acceptable; and a 95% 
confidence level with p = 0.5 is acceptable for most basic research studies. For a 
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dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) 
variable, a 5% margin of error is acceptable (Bartlett, et al., 2001). A 95% confidence 
level and p = 0.5 were assumed for the research study as this is acceptable for most basic 
research studies (Bartlett, et al., 2001). 
     For each research question, a null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are stated. 
Details are provided indicating the variables that were used and statistical calculations 
that were performed. Based on the principle of falsifiability (Gavin, 2008), statistical 
calculations were performed to test the null hypothesis for rejection.   
Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’ 
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type 
feedback comments from buyers predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent 
behavior.   For this analysis, the independent (predictor) variable was Negative-Positive 
Consensus field and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller 
behavior was represented by the Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus field.  
     Logistic regression was the appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research 
question was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive 
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) 
criterion variable. Results of the logistic regression are displayed in Figure 23. 
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Independent Variable B SE Wald p Exp(B) 
Negative Positive Feedback 0.60 0.06 97.27 < 0.001 1.82 
 
Model 
  
Y = -2.40 + 0.06* Negative-Positive Feedback 
 
Figure 23.  Negative-Positive Feedback Comments 
                   Predicting Evaluators’ Consensus of Seller Fraudulent Behavior 
 
     Any p less than 0.05 are significant. As seen in Figure 23, the p for the logistic 
coefficient was < 0.001 which means the logistic coefficient was statistically significant. 
     The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of 
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being 
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 84.40.  
     The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square 
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value 
with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically 
significant  (Fisher, 1995). 
     A Chi-Square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association 
between the independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) and the dependent 
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). The Chi-Square test was significant 
with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. It clearly rejected the null hypothesis that no 
independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) was correlated to the dependent 
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). With the Chi-Square test as significant 
and the logistical regression’s p as significant, it suggested that negative-positive type 
feedback comments from buyers predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent 
behavior.  
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     Two descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit are Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke 
(1991). In linear regression, R2 has a clearly defined definition as the proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictor(s) in the linear 
model.  Several attempts have been made to devise an equivalent of R2 for the logistic 
model.  None currently render the meaning of the variance (Menard, 2000). None 
correspond to predictive efficiency. For these two reasons, the two R2 indices were not 
included in the evaluation of the logistic model.  
     Wald statistics (Harrell, 2001) is for testing the significance of the explanatory 
(independent) variables in the logistics model. As only a single independent variable 
Negative-Positive Consensus was used, it rendered this statistic moot. 
     In Figure 23, B represents the regression coefficient for the predictor which is 
Negative-Positive Consensus. A positive regression coefficient means that the 
explanatory (independent) variable increases the probability of explanatory variable 
decreases the probability of the outcome.  A large regression coefficient means that the 
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of the outcome. A near-zero 
regression coefficient means the explanatory variable has little influence on the 
probability of the outcome. The value of B was 0.6 which showed an increase in 
probability of the outcome, but with a less than one multiplier the explanatory variable 
influence was moderated. 
     The exponent of B in the logistic regression yields the odds ratio. Odds ratios whose 
confidence limits are greater or less than one are statistically significant. For SPSS the 
odds ratio is labeled as Exp(B). The logit b = 0.6 in the B column in Figure 23 resulted in 
a corresponding odds ratio [Exp(B)] of 1.82. The results of the logistic regression 
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suggested that as buyers tended to have negative-positive feedback; sellers were 1.82 
times more likely to be fraudulent. 
 Negative-Positive Consensus  
Fraudulent 
Type 
Behavior 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 15 4 19 
No 101 382 483 
 Total Sellers 502 
 
Figure 24. Comparing Coders Negative-Positive Feedback Consensus 
                  to Seller Fraudulent Behavior by Evaluators 
 
     The actual counts of sellers based on coders negative-positive feedback consensus 
compared to sellers exhibiting fraudulent type behavior as found by the evaluators is 
summarized in Figure 24.  The off-diagonal cells in the table containing the values of 
four and 101 showed the lack of buyer negative-positive feedback comments when sellers 
were not exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. Conversely, the other off-diagonal cell in 
the table containing the values of 15 and 382 showed the presence of buyer negative-
positive feedback comments and when sellers exhibited fraudulent type behavior. 
The null hypothesis H1o was rejected for RQ1.   
Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict 
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does 
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments 
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not the number of negative-
positive type feedback comments predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent 
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behavior. The independent (predictor) variable was the Number of Negative-Positive 
Feedbacks Comments and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller 
behavior was represented by Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus (1 = Y, 0 = N). In this 
case, the independent variable was obtained by counting the number of negative-positive 
feedback comments for each seller to achieve a continuous value. The total seller 
population was 502 sellers. A total of 19 sellers were previously identified by evaluators 
as exhibiting fraudulent behavior. The remaining 483 sellers were previously identified as 
honest by the evaluators. The total number of buyer feedback comments previously 
categorized by coders as negative-positive type was 2,247. 
     Logistic regression was the appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research 
question was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive 
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) 
criterion variable. Results of the logistic regression are displayed in Figure 24. 
Independent Variable B SE Wald p Exp(B) 
Number of Negative-Positive 
Feedback Comments 
0.04 0.01 13.02 < 0.001 1.04 
 
Model 
 
Y = -3.51 + 0.04* Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments 
 
Figure 25.  Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments 
                   Predicting Evaluators’ Consensus of Seller Fraudulent Behavior 
 
     Any p less than 0.05 are significant. As seen in Figure 25, the p for the logistic 
coefficient was < 0.001 which means the logistic coefficient was statistically significant. 
     The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of 
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being 
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 10.92.  
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     The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square 
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value 
with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically 
significant  (Fisher, 1995). 
     A Chi-Square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association 
between the independent variable (Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments) 
and the dependent variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). The Chi-Square test 
was significance with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. It clearly rejected the null hypothesis 
that no independent variable (Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments) was 
linearly correlated to the log odds of the dependent variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior 
Consensus). With the Chi-Square test as significant and the logistical regression’s p as 
significant, it suggested that the number of negative-positive feedback comments from 
buyers predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent behavior.  
     Two descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit are Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke 
(1991). In linear regression, R2 has a clearly defined definition as the proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictor(s) in the linear 
model.   Several attempts have been made to devise an equivalent of R2 for the logistic 
model. None currently render the meaning of the variance (Menard, 2000). None 
correspond to predictive efficiency. For these two reasons, the two R2 indices were not 
included in the evaluation of the logistic model.  
     Wald statistics (Harrell, 2001) is for testing the significance of the explanatory 
(independent) variables in the logistics model. As only a single independent variable 
Negative-Positive Consensus was used, it rendered this statistic moot. 
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     In Figure 24, B represents the regression coefficient for the predictor which is 
Negative-Positive Consensus. A positive regression coefficient means that the 
explanatory (independent) variable increases the probability of explanatory variable 
decreases the probability of the outcome.  A large regression coefficient means that the 
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of the outcome. A near-zero 
regression coefficient means the explanatory variable has little influence on the 
probability of the outcome. The value of B was 0.04 which showed an increase in 
probability of the outcome, but with a less than one multiplier the explanatory variable 
influence was highly moderated. 
     The exponent of B in the logistic regression yields the odds ratio. Odds ratios whose 
confidence limits are greater or less than one are statistically significant. For SPSS the 
odds ratio is labeled as Exp(B). The logit b = 0.04 in the B column in Figure 23 resulted 
in a corresponding odds ratio [Exp(B)] of 1.04. The results of the logistic regression 
suggested that for every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive feedback 
comments, sellers were 1.04 times more likely to be fraudulent. 
The null hypothesis H2o was rejected for RQ2. 
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Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a 
cluster?  
Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not 
fall into a cluster.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall 
into a cluster.  
     A Chi-Square test was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type 
feedback comments fall into a cluster.  A cluster was determined when negative-positive 
type comments were found grouped around traditional [not negative-positive] comments 
in the sellers’ feedback comments history. For example, when negative-positive type 
comments were separated by two traditional comments, and then followed by another 
occurrence of a negative-positive comment, a cluster was identified. In a cluster, the 
negative-positive type comments could be separated by as many as two traditional 
comments. For this analysis, the feedback either fell into the cluster (Yes) or not (No). 
Results of the Chi-Square test are displayed in Figure 26. 
Chi2 df p No Cluster Cluster Expected 
426.18 1 <.001 694 109 401.5 
 
Figure 26.  Chi-Square on Negative-Positive Feedback Comments Falling 
                   into a Cluster 
 
     The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square 
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value 
with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically 
significant  (Fisher, 1995). 
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     The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of 
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being 
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 426.18. The results 
suggested that negative-positive type feedback comments did not fall into a cluster, 
therefore the null hypothesis was accepted. No clustering of negative-positive type 
feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal clustering of negative-
positive type comments.  The expected count for each cell was 401.5 [(694+109)/2)] 
suggesting that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive type comments that was 
clustered.   
The null hypothesis H3o was accepted for RQ3.   
Summary of Results 
     The research was divided into four parts – collecting the data using a web crawler, 
manually scrubbing the collected data, coding the data using crowdsourcing, and 
performing data analysis on the three research questions using SPSS. 
     The web crawler searched the category of Computers and Networking: PC Laptops 
and Notebooks extracting raw data consisting of 467,071 eBay buyer feedback 
comments. After scrubbing the data to only include qualified buyer feedback comments 
and eliminating outliers consisting of non-English comments, the remaining dataset to be 
processed contained 382,768 buyer feedback comments.  From the scrubbed dataset, a 
total of 502 unique eBay sellers were identified. 
     Using traditional dedicated raters to process the collected data was not viable due to 
extensive time required and high monetary cost.  An alternative solution of 
crowdsourcing was used with service provided by Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
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Crowdsourcing proved viable as all the work was processed in less than seven days with 
a considerable cost savings compared to traditional dedicated raters. Multiple techniques 
were used to ensure data quality - qualification tests and data quality techniques of 
multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum work time per HIT, gold 
standard data, and advice of auditing.   
     Evaluators identified 19 out of the 502 unique eBay sellers as exhibiting fraudulent 
behavior. This translated into 3.78% of the sellers classified as behaving fraudulently. 
The remaining 483 sellers were classified as honest.  
     Coders categorized 2,247 out of 382,768 buyer feedback comments as negative-
positive type. This translated into 0.59% of the total buyer feedback comments were 
negative-positive type. 
     The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research 
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question.  
     For research question 1 - Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? The null hypothesis of  
 Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not predict evaluators’ 
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on the results of the 
logistic regression and Chi-Square test.  The results of the logistic regression suggested 
that as buyers tended to have negative-positive feedback; sellers were 1.82 times more 
likely to be fraudulent. 
     For research question 2 - Does the number of negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
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The null hypothesis of The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does not 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on 
the results of the logistic regression and Chi-Square test. The results of the logistic 
regression suggested that for every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive 
feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times more likely to be fraudulent.   
     For research question 3 - For each seller will negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers fall into a cluster? The null hypothesis of For each seller will 
negative-positive feedback comments do not fall into a cluster was accepted based on the 
results of the Chi-Square test. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
     The research had a good outcome as an exploratory study. It identified a variable that 
appears to be a new indicator for identifying potentially fraudulent sellers in eBay. The 
research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback comments 
by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently.  
     The findings of  Zhang (2006) showed that eBay buyers provided 99% positive 
comments, 0.7% negative comments, and 0.3% neutral comments. In January 2008, eBay 
made a fundamental change to the feedback system where sellers could leave only 
positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That meant buyers were free to leave negative 
feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation. Logically, buyers should have responded 
by providing negative feedback when appropriate.  Gregg and Scott (2008) reported that 
although the new policy has been in effect for a year, the status quo remained with eBay 
still reporting less than 1% negative feedback; most members had a 99% or higher 
feedback rating; and the percentage of fraudulent transactions continued to rise.   
     This research study was conducted almost two years after the change in the eBay 
feedback system was implemented. It found almost exactly the same conditions 
previously reported by Gregg and Scott (2008) - eBay still reporting less than 1% 
negative feedback and most members had a 99% or higher feedback rating.  The research 
study found out of 467,071 buyer feedback comments – 98.67% were positive comments, 
0.52% were negative comments, 0.59% were neutral comments, and 0.22% were blank 
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comments (see Chapter 3 - Figure 22). Thus the premise for the research study – buyer 
reluctance to report negative feedback – was confirmed.  
     Three research questions were used in framing an answer for the research objective – 
Is the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers a predictor that a 
seller is behaving fraudulently? Each research question is presented and its findings from 
Chapter 4 analyzed. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) 
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’ 
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
     The null hypothesis of Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on 
the results from the logistic regression. The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 
(1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. As the null hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis 
H1a must be accepted.  
     The results of the logistic regression suggested that as buyers tended to have negative-
positive feedback; sellers were 1.82 times more likely to be fraudulent. This was 
evidence that the presence of even a single negative-positive feedback type comment had 
a strong correlation with a seller exhibiting fraudulent behavior. 
     Prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung (2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit, 
Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) used only negative feedback ratings and comments to 
identify sellers as fraudulent. As a signature, negative feedback ratings composed only 
0.7% per Zhang (2006) and 0.52% per the research study of the total feedback 
population.  Negative-positive feedback comments found in the research study composed 
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0.48% (2,247/467,071) of the total feedback population. Like the other signatures - 
negative and neutral feedback ratings - negative-positive type feedback composed only a 
small percentage of the total feedback population.   
     It would be more appropriate to measure negative-positive feedback comments within 
only the total positive feedback population. The prerequisite for a negative-positive 
feedback is the requirement of the feedback type being positive.  Within this smaller 
population, negative-positive feedback composed 0.59% (2,247/382,768) of the total 
positive feedback population. This was a slightly higher percent than the signature 
indicator of a negative rating at 0.52%. The larger presence of negative-positive type 
feedback would be consistent based on two buyer perceptions held by Nikitkov and Stone 
(2006). First - a positive feedback rating from the buyer even with a negative comment 
would not invite feedback retaliation from the seller. Second – the negative statement is 
concealed within the feedback comment, making it a more socially acceptable and a less 
drastic action than a blatant negative rating with negative comment.  
Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict 
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
     The null hypothesis of The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does 
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based 
on the results from the logistic regression. The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 
(1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. As the null hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis 
H2a must be accepted.  
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     The results of the logistic regression suggested that for every one unit increase in the 
number of negative-positive feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times (4%) more 
likely to be fraudulent. 
     The finding of the correlation between an increasing number of negative-positive 
feedback comments and an increasing probability that a seller was acting fraudulently 
was expected. A similar relationship was found in prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung 
(2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit, Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) with 
negative feedback. These researchers noted that a single incidence of a negative rating 
would normally not be sufficient to indicate that a seller was fraudulent. The presence of 
multiple negative ratings increased the probability that a seller was acting fraudulently.  
Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a 
cluster?  
     The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, p < 0.001. No clustering 
of negative-positive type feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal 
clustering of negative-positive type comments The expected count for each cell was 
401.5 [(694+109)/2)] indicating that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive 
type comments that was clustered. The results suggested that negative-positive type 
feedback comments did not fall into a cluster, therefore the null hypothesis of For each 
seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not fall into a cluster was accepted. 
Limitations 
     The major limitations of the research study were tied to three issues – fraudulent 
sellers, data source, and the ability to generalize the results.  
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     Locating eBay sellers that were behaving fraudulently was a difficult task. The 
primary source – eBay - refused to provide any type of information about why a seller 
was suspended or NARU (Not A Registered User). This complicated the study by 
requiring an extensive methodology to sift through and identify potentially fraudulent 
sellers. An identified fraudulent seller could not be stated definitively as a fraudster, but 
rather as having a high probability of exhibiting fraudulent behavior. 
     The second limitation was the data source. A custom web crawler was used for data 
collection. A web crawler had the obvious advantages of speed, ability to extract a 
massive quantity of data, and accuracy. When compared to more traditional approaches 
like surveys and experiments, it did not allow the researcher to establish controls that 
could have made the data a better fit for analysis. The raw public data was not as neat and 
clean when compared to a survey which is designed with analysis in mind. After data 
collection, considerable effort was required to convert the raw public data into a form that 
could actually be utilized for analysis. Mechanisms were required in the methodology to 
insure an unbiased data collection and conversion. 
     The third limitation was the ability to generalize the research results beyond eBay.  
Because it is the 800 pound gorilla in the online auction market and has been extensively 
studied by prior researchers, eBay was the logical choice.  However, eBay has other 
characteristics that might effect outcomes. One factor that could effect applying the 
results to another online auction company is use of a different feedback mechanism. For 
eBay, once the buyer or seller posts feedback it is immediately available to the other 
party. Other online auctions have different feedback mechanisms.  For example, a 
company could prevent viewing of feedback until either both parties post feedback or the 
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time allowed to post feedback has expired. This prevents either party from being 
influenced by the feedback from the other thus potentially negating the issue of tit-for-tat 
with negative feedback. Another limiting factor is the type of online market studied. As 
eBay is an online auction, attempting to apply the results to a fixed-priced online market 
like Amazon or Half.com would not be appropriate as other mitigating conditions could 
be present. 
Causal Direction 
     Correlational research design will not identify the causes or reasons for the observed 
behavior. This is because a correlational relationship between variables could be the 
result of an outside source. Based on this possibility, it must be understood that the 
correlation does not necessarily explain cause and effect. Hence the maxim – Correlation 
does not equal causation (Aldrich, 1995).   
     Under certain conditions, it is possible to have a high degree of confidence that there 
is causality between two variables. Determining the direction of causality can be difficult 
or impossible to quantify. Casual direction can be hinted if information about time is 
available. This is because a cause must precede its effects under classic Newtonian 
physics and natural laws. The type of data used was time-stamped historical transaction 
logs which provided the ability to indicate the direction of causality. 
     The direction of causality was from seller to buyer. A buyer cannot provide feedback 
about the item purchased or the seller until after the item is physically received. Making 
the statement “Good packaging, but slow shipping” is not logical or grounded until the 
package is physically in the buyer’s possession. An explicit negative feedback or hidden 
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complaint using a negative-positive statement in positive feedback by a buyer would be 
in response to negative or fraudulent action by a seller. 
Implications and Recommendations 
     The research study has both theoretical and practical implications. It presented a 
conceptual basis for the study of using negative-positive buyer feedback comments to 
identify fraudulently behaving sellers.  Empirical evidence from the study proved that 
negative-positive type feedback comments do exist although they constitute 0.59% of the 
total positive feedback population. Statistical analysis supported the hypothesis that there 
was a correlation between negative-positive type feedback comments and a seller 
behaving fraudulently. In addition, it supported a correlation between the number of 
negative-positive feedback type comments and an increasing probability that a seller was 
behaving fraudulently. 
     The contributions to knowledge were twofold.  First was identifying a potential new 
signature – negative-positive type feedback comments - for identifying fraudulently 
behaving sellers. Second was demonstrating the use of crowdsourcing as an effective and 
cost efficient means to detect fraudulent sellers in online auctions.  
     In January 2008, eBay made a fundamental change to the feedback system where 
sellers could leave only positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That meant buyers were 
free to leave negative feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation. One year after the 
eBay policy was implemented, Gregg and Scott (2008) found that buyers were still 
reluctant to provide negative feedback. As a contribution to the research literature, this 
research study extended the work of Gregg and Scott (2008) by finding that buyers were 
still reluctant even after two years to provide negative feedback.  
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     As potential practical contribution – the new signature combined with crowdsourcing 
could be used by eBay’s Security Department for detecting potentially fraudulent sellers. 
After a feedback comment is entered by an eBay buyer; it could be automatically 
processed. Only a positive rating with a feedback comment would need to be evaluated. 
Basic textual analysis could be performed on the feedback comment looking at syntax, 
structure, and content. Only a qualified positive feedback comments would need to be 
evaluated by placing an API call to AMT.  The processing does not need to be real-time, 
but timely updating of an eBay seller’s profile would reduce the window of opportunity 
for a fraudulent seller. Although hidden from public view, the negative-positive 
correlation factor when added to an eBay user’s profile could be internally used by eBay 
as one more tool in identifying and monitoring potentially fraudulent sellers. 
     Textual analysis of the buyer feedback comments was gross and not granular. The text 
contained in a positive feedback comment was evaluated in entirety as a binary - 
negative-positive type feedback (Y) or not (N). Future research using a more detailed 
data mining of the feedback comment texts could provide scalar indicators or predictors 
for identifying fraudulent sellers.  For example – “Good packing, slow shipping” would 
be a low level indicator as a seller could live in a remote location or typically uses a slow 
shipper.  “Good packing, but product was not new” would be a higher level indicator of 
fraudulent behavior as the seller said the product was new, but sent used. 
     A question that could be asked is - Can Buyer Complaint category in negative-positive 
type feedback comments be used to fine tune indicators or predictors for identifying 
fraudulent sellers? For future research, textual analysis of the buyer feedback comment 
could be performed based on Buyer Complaint categories – product, shipping, 
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communication, and other (non-specific). Each negative-positive buyer feedback 
comment would be classified into one or more of the Buyer Complaint categories using a 
vector like Φn = [<product>, <shipping>, <communication>, <other>]. This text mining 
technique of feedback comment text has been used in prior research by Ghose, Ipeirotis, 
Sundararajan (2005).   
     Prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung (2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit, 
Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) used only negative feedback ratings and comments to 
identify sellers as fraudulent. An interesting future study would be comparing the two 
methods – negative feedback and negative-positive feedback. The proposed study would 
further validate each method and provide a comparative measure of their effectiveness in 
identifying fraudulent sellers. Locating fraudulent sellers for the proposed study would 
need to be done independently using a grounded method like a survey of eBay buyers, 
police reports, etc.  
Summary 
     Online auction fraud represents a serious threat to e-commerce and undermines online 
trust.  As fraud is pervasive, growing in use, and difficult to detect in online auctions; 
new techniques are needed for the early detection of opportunistic sellers. An 
opportunistic seller is someone who attempts to negate online auction safeguards and 
exploit buyers for monetary gain. 
     Understanding and identifying occurrences of online deception is critical for 
increasing participation in online auctions and other forms of e-commerce, as victims of 
fraud will leave the online auction market and potential new customers withhold 
participation based on fear of becoming a fraud victim. Identifying online deception is 
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important as deception in any form is the enemy of trust and some degree of trust is 
required for all business transactions. Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create 
an illusion of trustworthiness to the buyers’ detriment.  
     Reputation systems are used in online communities as normally a member has no prior 
knowledge or experience interacting with another member. Unlike a traditional auction 
which relies on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were trustworthy with me 
before.” An online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust you because you 
were trustworthy with others before.”  In both cases past trustworthiness is a prerequisite 
for future transactions.  It is the information about reputation that enables trust by 
inducing a reciprocal response. 
     The eBay reputation system is based on feedback provided by buyers and sellers. For 
each transaction the buyers and sellers can opt to appraise the other party by leaving 
feedback. Feedback consists of a positive, negative or neutral rating with an optional 
short comment. Feedback score is a number used to measure a member's reputation on 
eBay. A high feedback score means that a member has received a high number of 
positive ratings from other members. Every member of eBay has a feedback score. Prior 
research studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates substantially higher than eBay 
reputation system’s reported negative feedback rate of less than 1%. The conclusion was 
most buyers were withholding reports of negative feedback in fear of retaliation from the 
seller. 
     Nikitov and Stone (2006) found that buyers sometimes embedded negative comments 
in positive feedback as a means of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their 
reputation. The researchers surmised that these “negative-positive” feedback postings 
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contained hidden signals to the buyer community about a problematic or fraudulent 
seller. The composition of negative-positive feedback included both positive and negative 
aspects of a transaction. Negative-positive complaints were usually in the formats of “I 
was pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” or “I was unhappy about Y, 
but was pleased with X for the transaction.”  Typical examples are “Good product, but 
slow shipping” and “Took 7 days and 2 messages before replying to my email, but 
product was well packaged.”  
     The concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature to identify potential 
opportunistic sellers in an online auction population was never explored. This gap 
provided a narrowly scoped and tightly bounded area for research with a goal of the early 
detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use of negative-positive 
feedback. 
     The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive 
type feedback comments by buyers (independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is 
behaving fraudulently (dependent variable).  A correlational research design was selected 
as it provided for discovering relationships between variables, measuring the degree and 
direction of relationships, and from the discovered relationships predictions could be 
made. 
     The research study implemented a correlational research design using an automated 
data collection agent. The research study required the extraction and analyzing of data 
that met predefined qualifying conditions from the immense eBay data sets. Manually 
sifting through data sets of this magnitude was not practical due to the time and labor 
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required to extract the qualified data. Instead customized software in the form of web 
crawler was used to search, locate, and extract the qualified data from the eBay website.  
     Detection of negative-positive feedback by buyers required the examination, 
interpretation, and categorization of each buyer’s feedback comment text. As natural 
language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can be 
incomplete, and prone to errors in spelling and/or grammar; it was necessary to transpose 
the relevant written text into a formatted and coded structure. A coded structure provides 
data uniformity and enables automated analysis. 
     Contextual analysis is a systematic method for analyzing data in a standardized way. 
The term textual analysis is used when contextual analysis is applied to written 
communication. Using textual analysis provided a powerful and effective technique for 
coding and categorizing the buyer feedback comments. Codes were used to create 
categorical variables representing the original textual information. The resulting 
categorical variables were analyzed using standard statistical methods.  
     The textual communications found in feedback comments were in natural language 
format with complex overtones and subtle nuances which precluded any easy method for 
representation in a coded structure. As automated textual analysis software currently have 
limited capabilities and accuracy, it was necessary to use a human to make the 
appropriate judgment of whether or not a feedback comment was in negative-positive 
format. 
     The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive 
type feedback comments by buyers (independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is 
behaving fraudulently (dependent variable). Identification of feedback comments by 
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buyers as negative-positive or not has been addressed. Next sellers needed to be 
identified as behaving honestly or fraudulently. 
     There are only two sources with authority that can equitably state an eBay member is 
a fraudster – eBay and criminal court rulings. Due to confidentiality, eBay will not 
provide any details to third-parties on complaints against a member or indicate why a 
member’s account was suspended or disabled.  Therefore, an explicit confirmation that a 
specific online auction member was an opportunistic seller from the primary source – 
eBay - was not available. As criminal court records containing formal prosecutions for 
online auction fraud are very limited in number, could be sealed preventing public access 
to the details or take years for a final legal verdict to be reached; they were not used. 
Therefore secondary sources were used to draw inferences on a seller’s behavior as 
honest or fraudulent. 
     Human behavior is complex and sometimes inconsistent; attempting to find a single 
specific behavior pattern to signal fraudulent behavior would not be realistic. Taking a 
clue from prior research into credit card fraud, online auction fraud detection is based on 
looking for red flags and behavior patterns (Bhargava, et al., 2003).  The mechanical 
process of going through a long checklist of all the potential red flags and behavior 
patterns for even a single seller would be time consuming and any lapse by an evaluator 
would result in a misclassification. An automated means for making the required 
judgment to classify a seller as behaving honestly or fraudulently was not available. In 
order to reduce the manual labor required a software application named Auction 
Inquisitor that automatically searched for red flags and suspect behavior patterns in eBay 
auctions was used. Auction Inquisitor as a front end for the evaluation process provided 
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the following advantages – greatly reduced the time required to review the red flags and 
suspect behavior patterns for a seller; enabled the review process to be performed 
consistently and without human error; and presented the results in a summarized and 
standardized format. 
     A pilot test was performed using dedicated raters to evaluate the sellers as honest or 
fraudulent and code buyer feedback comments as negative-positive type feedback or not. 
Based on the results of the pilot test, the time required to process the data and estimated 
labor costs were not feasible.  An alternative method of crowdsourcing was tested. It 
proved feasible in terms of time required to process and estimated costs.  The 
crowdsourcing service was provided using Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
     When using crowdsourcing, data quality control is a major issue as unseen, remote, 
and random strangers are being asked to perform your task. First - How do you know that 
the workers will have the prerequisite skills or knowledge to perform correctly the task? 
Second - How do you know that the workers will actually make an effort to perform the 
task rather than just randomly click on responses? These issues were addressed by using 
qualification tests and data quality techniques of multiple worker assignments per HIT 
(plurality), minimum work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing.   
     The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research 
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question. The result for each 
research question is summarized here. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
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Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not 
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers 
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     The null hypothesis H1o was rejected based on the results from the logistic regression. 
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. As the null 
hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis H1a was accepted.  Sellers were 1.82 
times more likely to be fraudulent with the presence of even a single negative-positive 
feedback type comment. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does the number of negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? 
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does 
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments 
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior. 
     The null hypothesis H2o was rejected based on the results from the logistic regression. 
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. As the null 
hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis H2a was accepted. The results of the 
logistic regression indicated that for every one unit increase in the number of negative-
positive feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times (4%) more likely to be fraudulent.  
Research Question 3 (RQ3): For each seller will negative-positive type feedback 
comments from buyers fall into a cluster?  
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Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not 
fall into a cluster.  
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall 
into a cluster.  
     The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, p < 0.001. No clustering 
of negative-positive type feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal 
clustering of negative-positive type comments The expected count for each cell was 
401.5 [(694+109)/2)] indicating that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive 
type comments that was clustered. The results suggested that negative-positive type 
feedback comments did not fall into a cluster, therefore the null hypothesis H3o was 
accepted. 
     The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers were a predictor that a seller was behaving fraudulently. The 
research had a good outcome as an exploratory study. It confirmed the variable – 
negative-positive type feedback comment - as a new indicator for identifying potentially 
fraudulent sellers on eBay.  Multiple occurrences of negative-positive type feedback 
comments by buyers increased the probability that a seller was behaving fraudulently. 
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Appendix A 
 
Methodology Overview 
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Appendix B 
 
CSV Data File Schema 
 
 
 
For every feedback entry found in a qualified seller’s transaction history, a record will be 
created. Each record will have the following format: 
 
Data File Schema 
Field Name Field Format Rules 
Feedback Number 6 digits Autonumber (unique) 
Item Number  15 digits Extracted from  
Buyer Item Purchased 
Seller eBay Userid 30 characters Can not be blank. 
Seller Feedback Score 6 digits 0 to 999999 
Seller Positive Feedback 
Percent 
5 digits 000.00 to 100.00 
Seller Member Since 20 characters Can not be blank. 
Seller Status 25 characters Can not be blank. 
Buyer Feedback Type 8 characters 
 
NEGATIVE 
POSITIVE 
NEUTRAL 
Buyer Feedback Comment 80 characters Optional 
Could be blank 
Buyer eBay Userid 30 characters Can not be blank. 
Buyer Feedback Date 15 characters Can not be blank. 
Buyer Item Purchased 100 characters Can not be blank. 
Includes item number. 
Buyer Item Cost 15 characters Can not be blank. 
Seller Reply Info 80 characters Optional 
Could be blank. 
Seller Reply Text 80 characters Optional 
Could be blank. 
Buyer Follow-up Info 80 characters Optional 
Could be blank. 
Buyer Follow-up Text 80 characters Optional 
Could be blank. 
Record Layout Continues on Next Page 
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Record Layout Continued from Prior Page 
↓ Data Analysis ↓ 
Evaluator Userid 1 14 characters Not blank 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Evaluator Userid 2 14 characters Not blank 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 2 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Evaluator Userid 3 14 characters Not blank 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Evaluator Userid 4 14 characters Not blank 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 4 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Evaluator Userid 5 14 characters Not blank 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 5 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus 1 character Y – Yes 
N - No 
Coder Userid 1 14 characters Not blank 
Negative-Positive 1 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
Coder Userid 2 14 characters Not blank 
Negative-Positive 2 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
Coder Userid 3 14 characters Not blank 
Negative-Positive 3 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
Coder Userid 4 14 characters Not blank 
Negative-Positive 4 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
Coder Userid 5 14 characters Not blank 
Negative-Positive 5 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
Negative-Positive Consensus 1 character Y – Yes 
N – No 
 
The data schema is not normalized. Ergo - Seller eBay Userid, Seller Feedback Score, 
Seller Positive Feedback Percent, Seller Member Since, and Seller Status fields are 
duplicated in each record. This has been done to make the evaluation, coding, and 
statistical processing easier. 
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Appendix C 
 
Data Collection Agent 
 
 
 
 
Overview of the catalog structure for organizing eBay sales items 
on which the crawler will need to transverse. 
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Overview of the Crawling Mechanics 
1. Start up the eBay crawling program. 
2. When prompted with:  
Minimum feedback score to qualify seller? 
3. Type in 600 and press the ENTER key  
NOTE: The program will maintain and eventually print out two numbers. 
             - Total number of sellers found (crawled). 
             - Total number of qualified sellers (>= minimum feedback score).  
4. Based on the structure for organizing eBay sales items, it will be necessary to 
manually provide the starting point. Use the following address: 
http://computers.shop.ebay.com/PC-Laptops-Netbooks-/ 
5. The crawler will now be at the main list of sales items. 
 
6. Begin loop to process all sales items in the specified sales item list. 
Find the next (unprocessed) sales item on the webpage. 
WARNING: We have two levels of complexity for this. 
Level 1 - a page can contain 1 or more sales items. 
Level 2 - there can be more than one page 
7. If End-of-List then: 
  Close the CVS ASCII data file. 
  Display a message: 
  ##### total number of sellers crawled 
  ##### total number of qualified sellers 
  Have a CLOSE button to close the crawler dialog window. 
  Terminate the program. 
OR 
  Next sales item was found – continue to next step. 
COMMENT: Basically keep looping till all sales items are processed. 
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8. Go to the sales item webpage. 
 
9. Locate eBay Seller Userid. 
10. Check Sellers Crawled List – has this seller already been crawled? 
If YES, then do not continue – return to step 6. 
If NO, then continue to next step. 
11. Increment Total Number of Sellers Found by 1. 
12. Locate Feedback Score for seller. 
13. Is the seller’s feedback score >= Minimum feedback score? 
If NO, then do not continue – return to step 6. 
If YES, then continue to next step  
14. Increment Total Number of Qualified Sellers by 1.  
15. Add eBay Seller Userid to the Sellers Crawled List. 
16. Click hyperlink for eBay Seller Userid 
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17. Begin process to gather all sales transactions for the qualified seller. 
 
18. Locate and click on the hyperlink named See All 
19. The crawler is now looking at Feedback Profile webpage for the specified eBay 
Userid. 
NOTE: To see the remainder of the webpage you would need to scroll down. 
Now that crawler is at the appropriate screen, from this point on the program needs to 
scrap/extract all the required data. 
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20. First collect the eBay member’s general data. 
This data will appear on every feedback record for the seller in the CSV ASCII data 
file. 
A  Seller eBay Userid 
B Seller Feedback Score 
C Seller Positive Feedback Percent 
D Seller Member Since 
E Seller Status 
 
21. Begin loop to scrap/extract all feedback records for the seller. 
Find the first feedback transaction on the page. 
 
22. Extract the data for the feedback transaction: 
A Buyer Feedback Type 
B Buyer Feedback Comment 
C Buyer eBay Userid 
D Buyer Feedback Date 
E Buyer Item Purchased 
F Buyer Item Cost 
G Seller Reply Info 
H Seller Reply Text 
I Buyer Follow-up Info 
J Buyer Follow-up Text 
NOTE: This is a fully populated feedback with every optional data field being used. 
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NOTE: This is a typical feedback with only the required data field. 
23. Assemble the scraped off data into to a CSV (tab delimitated) text file format. 
See Appendix C for detailed information on the record layout. 
24. Display a message on the progress: 
##### total number of sellers crawled 
##### total number of qualified sellers 
25. Attempt to find the NEXT feedback entry. 
WARNING: We have two levels of complexity for this. 
Level 1 - a page can contain 1 or more feedback entries. 
Level 2 - there can be more than one page 
26. If End-of-List then: 
  Display a message: 
  ##### total number of sellers crawled 
  ##### total number of qualified sellers 
  Go back to step 6 
OR 
  Next item was found – Go back to step 21 
COMMENT: Basically keep looping till all feedback entries are processed. 
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Appendix D 
 
Evaluator Worksheet 
 
 
 
Evaluator Worksheet 
Seller eBay Userid:   
Fraudulent-Type Behavior? No (Honest) □ 
Yes 
(Fraudulent) □ 
 
Attributes of Fraud Comments 
Condition (said new was used) 
 
Deficit attributes 
 
Failed to ship 
 
Incorrect color shipped 
 
Incorrect product 
 
Incorrect quantity shipped 
 
Missing or damaged parts 
 
Not genuine (copy) 
 
Poor or badly packaged 
 
Product not as described 
 
Shipped late 
 
Other: __________________ 
 
Secondary Sources Found □ NO □ YES  
Secondary Source Comments  
 
 
 
 
Other Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluator Userid 
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Appendix E 
 
Coding: Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent 
 
Objective 
The objective of this assignment is for you to make a judgment if an eBay seller is 
exhibiting fraudulent type behavior when selling to eBay buyers. 
 
Legal Disclaimer 
Inclusion of an eBay userid in this study does NOT imply that said person (or 
organization) has in the past exhibited fraudulent type behavior. Nor does it imply that 
said person (or organization) is currently exhibiting fraudulent type behavior.  All the 
eBay userids included in this research study were selected at random.  
 
Confidentiality 
Your judgment will remain confidential to ensure the integrity of the research study. For 
the research report - all evaluator identifying information will be redacted in order to 
protect the privacy of participating workers. For the research report - all eBay identifying 
information will be redacted in order to protect the privacy of the eBay members.   
  
Overview of the Process 
In order to make your judgment, you will need to complete the following steps: 
• Understand what actions constitute fraudulent type behavior. 
• Review the online profile of the eBay userid. 
• Search using Google for references of the eBay userid on the Internet. 
• Review an analytical report on the eBay userid. 
• Using the above data answer the question: 
Is the seller exhibiting fraudulent type behavior? 
Details for these steps will be provided below. 
 
Estimated Time to Complete the Assignment 
Making an informed judgment is a complex process and takes time. 
There is no time limit – Take all the time you want to gather all the data necessary and 
make your final judgments. 
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What is Fraudulent Behavior? 
For this research study - fraudulent type behavior will be defined as follows: 
• If the seller ships an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing the buyer for 
the delay, late shipping constitutes fraudulent type behavior.  
• If the product differs from the item’s auction description in make, model or condition 
(i.e. used vs. new), constitutes fraudulent type behavior.  
• If the seller does not explicitly state that the item is not genuine (i.e. a copy), 
constitutes fraudulent type behavior.  
• If any deficit attributes of the product are not explicitly stated (i.e. headphones with a 
six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot cord), constitutes fraudulent 
type behavior. 
• If the product is damaged in shipment due to poor packaging, constitutes fraudulent 
type behavior.   
• If the seller collected the buyer’s money and failed to ship the item, constitutes 
fraudulent type behavior.  
 
Instructions 
1.  Log on the PC with your provided evaluator userid and password. 
2. Start up the Auction Inquisitor program. 
3. Pull a form from the pile of sellers which you are to review. 
NOTE: Forms are prefilled with Seller’s eBay Userid and Buyer Item Purchased. 
4. If all the sellers have been reviewed, then logoff the computer and stop evaluating. 
5. Open up a web browser using Internet Explorer or Firefox. 
6. Go to the following address: 
http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback-login.html 
7. You should now be at the Feedback Forum: Find Member page. 
 
8. In the white box located below eBay Users ID type in the Seller’s eBay Userid 
9. Click on the FIND MEMBER button 
10. You will now be at the Feedback Profile for the Seller’s eBay Userid. 
Click on the FEEDBACK AS SELLER tab located at the bottom of the Feedback 
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Profile. 
 
11. You will now only see feedback comments made by buyers that purchased a product 
from eBay userid Seller’s eBay Userid. 
Use the PREVIOUS and NEXT options on the bottom of the Feedback Profile 
screen to scroll through all the available feedback comments. 
 
12. The What is Fraudulent Behavior? paragraph at the beginning of this document 
indicated what actions constitute fraudulent type behavior for this research study. 
 
The questions below focus these actions to assist you in the review process. 
You have the OPTION of using the Evaluator Worksheet to write notes or comments 
regarding the seller being reviewd. 
 
You can see in the below picture where the find the Feedback Comment and the 
eBay userid of the Buyer who wrote the comment. 
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Did the seller ship an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing the buyer for 
the delay? 
 
Did the product differ from the item’s auction description in make, model or 
condition (i.e. used vs. new, wrong color, marked/damaged)? 
 
Did the seller not explicitly state that the item was not genuine (i.e. a copy) and 
shipped a fake or facsimile? 
 
Any deficit attributes of the product that were are not explicitly stated by the seller 
(i.e. headphones with a six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot cord)? 
 
Was the product is damaged in shipment due to poor packaging by the seller? 
 
Do you find any other feedback from the buyer that would indicated potentially 
fraudulent type behavior by the seller? 
 
13. Secondary Reference 
Open up another web browser using Internet Explorer or Firefox. 
14. Go to the following address: 
http://www.google.com 
15. You should now be at the Google search screen: 
 
16. Type in the eBay userid Seller’s eBay Userid 
17. Click on the GOOGLE SEARCH button. 
18. You are looking for secondary sources on the Internet that reference the eBay userid. 
These references (if any) need to be used in making your judgment on whether or not 
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the eBay userid is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. 
WARNING: The below image is only an example and should not be used to answer 
the questions. 
 
Did you find one or more secondary references using Google search? 
 
Do one or more of the secondary references found using Google search provide 
evidence that the eBay userid was exhibiting fraudulent type behavior? 
 
19. Analytical Report 
A review of the analytical report must be included in making your judgment on 
whether or not the eBay seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. 
Next to the Seller’s eBay Userid in the form, find the Buyer Item Purchased. 
The Item Number should look similar to the following format (#270523761975). 
20. Switch to the Auction Inquisitor program. 
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21. Type in the Item Number into the white box above the words: 
Enter Auction Number or Auction URL here 
 
22. Click on the Analyze Auction button. 
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23. An analysis report will be produced looking similar to this. 
 
24. Using the Evaluator Worksheet as a guide, review the analysis report. 
 
25. Framing Your Judgment 
Would you buy on eBay a product from this eBay seller? 
  
Would you recommend this eBay userid as a seller to a friend?  
 
Would you recommend this eBay userid as a seller to a family member? 
 
26. Final Judgment  
Now you need the answer the final question of: 
Is the eBay seller exhibiting fraudulent type behavior? 
NO - the seller is not acting fraudulently (i.e. honest behavior) 
YES - the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e. fraudulent behavior).  
27. Mark your judgment on the form next to Fraudulent Type Behavior? 
by placing an X in the NO (HONEST) or YES (FRAUDULENT) check box. 
28. Place the completed form in the “done” pile. 
29. Close the Auction Inquisitor analysis window. 
30. Close the web browser window. 
31. Repeat the review process on the next seller - Go to step 3.  
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Appendix F 
 
Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive 
 
 
Tutorial 
You will be presented with a statement to categorize. 
The provided statement was made by a BUYER in response to a purchase from a 
SELLER. 
Your task will be to determine if the provided statement is in NEGATIVE-POSITIVE 
format or not. 
 
Key Concept 
A statement in NEGATIVE-POSITIVE format contains a MINIMUM of one negative 
declaration AND one positive declaration. 
 
Constructs 
Details of a simple statement's construct: 
I was pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction. 
Positive declaration => I was pleased with X 
Negative declaration => unhappy about Y 
 
Negative-positive statements are usually in a simple format like: 
"I was happy about X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction.” 
“I was unhappy about X, but was pleased with Y for the transaction.” 
 
Examples (Positive then negative): 
Good product, but slow shipment. 
Great quality, but poor packaging. 
 
Examples (Negative then positive): 
Not exactly what I expected, but well packaged. 
Slow delivery, but great quality. 
 
Alternative complex NEGATIVE-POSITIVE formats use conjunctions [and, but], 
prepositions [with], multiple sentences or in combination. 
 
Examples (complex formats): 
Good product and slow shipment. 
Not exactly what I expected and well packaged. 
Good product with slow shipment. 
Poor service and good quality. 
Not exactly what I expected. Well packaged. 
 
Examples (Complex formats with multiple negative and/or positives): 
Good product. Well packaged. Slow shipment. 
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Good product. Well packaged, but slow shipment. 
Good product. Well packaged with slow shipment. 
Good product. Poorly packaged. Fast shipment. 
Took 7 days to reply to my email. Slow shipment, but well packaged. 
 
Examples that are NOT in negative-positive format: 
**** (non-informational) 
The weather today was beautiful. (not relevant) 
Great seller! (one positive) 
Shipped the wrong color! (one negative) 
Good product and good shipment. (two positives) 
Good product. Good packaging. (two positives) 
Took 7 days to reply to my email and poorly packaged. (two negatives) 
 
Example Question #1 
Is the following statement in negative-positive format? 
(123456) Good packing, but slow delivery. 
 O   NO     
 O  YES 
Answer: YES - the statement is in negative-positive format. 
               Meets the MINIMUM of one positive declarative AND one negative 
declarative. 
 
Example Question #2 
Is the following statement in negative-positive format? 
(123457) Good product. Fast shipping. Securely packaged. 
 O   NO     
 O  YES 
Answer: NO - the statement is NOT in negative-positive format. 
              Has 3 positive declarative AND 0 (zero) negative declarative. 
              Does NOT meet the MINIMUM of one positive declarative AND one negative 
declarative. 
 
 
Additional Notes 
• The provided statements were made by a BUYER in response to a purchase from a 
SELLER. 
• The provided statements have NOT been edited. 
• Natural language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can 
be incomplete, missing punctuation, can have errors in spelling, and/or can have 
errors in grammar. 
• Your task is first to interpret the provided statement as best as possible. 
• Next you are to render your best judgment on whether or not the provided statement 
is in negative-positive format. 
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Abbreviated Example of a Coder Worksheet 
 
Coder Worksheet 
Coder Userid 123  
   
Feedback Number Statement Answer 
123450 Slow delivery, but great quality.  
123451 Not exactly what I expected, but well packaged.  
123452 Shipped the wrong color!  
 
 
 
Instructions to Coder 
 
1. You will be given a Coder Worksheet. 
Verify that your Coder Userid matches that found on the worksheet. 
In the above example – 123 is the Coder Userid. 
 
2. Each line in the worksheet contains a statement that you will need to evaluate. 
Find the first line in the worksheet that has NOT been evaluated. 
If all lines have been evaluated, then STOP evaluating. 
 
3. Read the statement in the line. 
In the above example – the first line’s statement is: 
Slow delivery, but great quality. 
 
4. Is the statement in negative-positive format? 
If YES, then write Y under Answer and go to step 2. 
If NO, then write N under Answer and go to step 2. 
 
NOTE 
You must provide a Y or N for the Answer in every line. 
Do not leave any Answer blank. 
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Appendix G 
 
Research Qualifications Seller Test 
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NOTE 
The Test Method is manual rather than automatic. Approval (i.e. pass/fail) of the 
worker’s test requires a manual approval by the requester. 
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Appendix H 
 
Research Prototype Seller HIT 
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  Appendix I 
 
Research Qualifications Feedback Test 
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Appendix J 
 
Research Prototype Feedback HIT 
With Instructions Hidden 
 
 
Template: Research - coder - q1 - v1 
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Appendix K 
 
Research Prototype Feedback HIT 
With Instructions Displayed 
 
 
Template: Research - coder - q1 - v1 
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Appendix L 
 
Research Production Feedback HIT 
 
 
 
Template: Research - coder - q10 - v1   
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